The contents of this Manual have been drafted in accordance with the latest agreed procedures of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association (CACFOA), the Ambulance Service Association (ASA), London boroughs and the Home Office. Extensive consultation has also been undertaken with the military, voluntary services and emergency services of surrounding county areas.

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1. Introduction

1.1 The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) was formed in 1973 and consists of representatives from the Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance Service and local authorities. The Port of London Authority (PLA), Marine Coastguard, RAF, Military and voluntary sector are also represented. LESLP has the ability to invite representatives from other agencies into the group when required, dependent on the nature and type of incident. The group meets once every three months under the chair of the Metropolitan Police Service, Emergency Preparedness Operational Command Unit.

1.2 The procedures adopted by each of the emergency services in response to a major incident are understandably devoted to the role of the service concerned. The purpose of this document is to describe the agreed procedures and arrangements for the effective co-ordination of their joint efforts. In this way the overall response of the emergency services will be greater than the sum of their individual efforts, to the benefit of the public.

1.3 This Manual provides summaries of the responses and responsibilities of each of the emergency services at a major incident, as well as an outline of the support role offered by local authorities. We hope it will offer better understanding to the individual specialists involved in working with each other in a co-ordinated way.

1.4 There are many serious and protracted incidents which do not meet the criteria for a major incident but which would nonetheless warrant a co-ordinated effort from the services involved. These events have impacted on the emergency services and local authorities, and necessitated the implementation of special arrangements to manage these incidents, and clear benefits have been achieved from using the relevant aspects from this Manual and maintaining the continuity of the co-ordinated approach these procedures provide.

1.5 This Manual has been prepared for the information and guidance of the emergency services and local authorities but may be used by any other responsible organisation which may have to respond to a major incident. It must be remembered that the procedures within this Manual are generally related to activities at, or ancillary to, the scene of the incident, and that have a bearing on a number of the agencies involved. Detailed descriptions of single service functions are not included. The Manual includes references to roles and responsibilities of some non-emergency service organisations. The list of organisations included is not exhaustive and it is recognised that a wide range of organisations is likely to be involved in supporting the response of the emergency services.

1.6 LESLP recognises that every major incident is different and has its own unique features. The advice contained within this Manual should be regarded only as guidance. It is designed to offer a framework within which those who are responsible for the successful resolution of the incident are able to work together with maximum efficiency.
1.7 Experience has taught that there are many seemingly harmless sets of circumstances which can, if not dealt with speedily, escalate to the level of a major incident. Prevention is better than cure. No-one will be criticised for treating an incident as serious in the first instance even if events later prove it not to be. The definitions and procedures contained in this Manual, dealing with major incidents, apply equally to arrangements which should be put in place to ensure the speedy resolution of seemingly minor incidents.

1.8 It should be noted that the procedures set out in this Manual would apply to major incidents initiated by terrorist acts.
2. Major incidents

2.1 Definition

2.1.1 A major incident is any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services and will generally include the involvement, either directly or indirectly, of large numbers of people. For example:

- the rescue and transportation of a large number of casualties;
- the large-scale combined resources of the police, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service;
- the mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and support services; for example, local authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people; and
- the handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated both from the public and the news media usually made to the police.

Acts of terrorism including suspected involvement of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices are subject to a specific multi-agency response supported by HM Government. This response is reinforced by the principles contained in this Manual (see Appendix A).

2.2 Declaration

2.2.1 A major incident can be declared by any member of the emergency services which considers that any of the criteria outlined above has been satisfied. In certain circumstances, such as flooding, the local authority may declare a major incident.

2.2.2 Despite the fact that what is a major incident to one of the emergency services may not be so to another, each of the other emergency services will attend with an appropriate pre-determined response. This is so even if they are to be employed in a stand-by capacity and not directly involved in the incident.
2.3 Stages

2.3.1 Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

- the initial response;
- the consolidation phase;
- the recovery phase; and
- the restoration of normality.

2.3.2 An investigation into the cause of the incident, together with the attendant hearings, may be superimposed onto the whole structure.
3. **Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies**

### 3.1 General

3.1.1 Rescue will most frequently be the prime function required of the emergency services. Responsibility for the rescue of survivors lies with the London Fire Brigade (LFB). The care and transportation of casualties to hospital is the responsibility of the London Ambulance Service (LAS). Police will ease these operations by co-ordinating the emergency services, local authorities and other agencies.

### 3.2 Police

3.2.1 The primary areas of police responsibility at a major incident are:

- the saving of life together with the other emergency services;
- the co-ordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations acting in support at the scene of the incident;
- to secure, protect and preserve the scene and to control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons;
- the investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable;
- the collection and distribution of casualty information;
- the identification of the dead on behalf of Her Majesty’s (HM) Coroner;
- the prevention of crime;
- family liaison; and
- short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken.

### 3.3 Fire Brigade

3.3.1 The primary areas of LFB responsibility at a major incident are:

- life-saving through search and rescue;
- firefighting and fire prevention;
- rendering humanitarian services;
- detection, identification, monitoring and management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment;
- provision of qualified scientific advice in relation to HAZMAT incidents via their scientific advisors;
- salvage and damage control;
- safety management within the inner cordon; and
- to maintain emergency service cover throughout the LFB area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time.
3.4 Ambulance Service

3.4.1 The primary areas of responsibility for the LAS at a major incident may be summarised as:

- to save life together with the other emergency services;
- to provide treatment, stabilisation and care of those injured at the scene;
- to provide appropriate transport, medical staff, equipment and resources;
- to establish an effective triage sieve and triage sort system to determine the priority evacuation needs of those injured and to establish a safe location for casualty clearing, i.e. triage sort area;
- to provide a focal point at the incident for all National Health Service (NHS) and other medical resources;
- to provide communication facilities for NHS resources at the scene, with direct radio links to hospitals, control facilities and any other agency as required;
- to nominate and alert the receiving hospitals from the official list of hospitals to receive those injured and inform the other agencies;
- to provide transport to the incident scene for the Medical Incident Officer (MIO), mobile medical/surgical teams and their equipment;
- to arrange the most appropriate means of transporting those injured to the receiving and specialist hospitals;
- to maintain emergency cover throughout the LAS area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time; and
- to act as a portal into the wider health services including the Health Protection Agency Regional Health Emergency Planning Advisors, and in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incident advise on the convening of the Health Advisory Team (HAT), which will be able to advise and lead as far as health advice is concerned.

3.5 The Health Advisory Team (HAT)

3.5.1 The HAT is a strategic group chaired by the NHS, composed of representatives from a range of organisations and specialities who are able to give co-ordinated authoritative advice on the health aspects of an incident to the police Incident Commander, the NHS and other agencies.

3.5.2 HAT is activated through the HPA via LAS Control.

3.6 The National Health Service

3.6.1 For the NHS a major incident is defined as the following:

- when the number or type of casualties overwhels or threatens to overwhelm normal services, special arrangements are needed to deal with them;
- when an incident may pose a threat to the health of the community; and
- the Health Service itself may suffer serious internal disruption.
### Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

**3.7  Local authority**

3.7.1  See Chapter 13.

**3.8  HM Coastguard**

3.8.1  See Appendix D.
4. Actions by first officers at the scene

4.1 General

4.1.1 It is important to stress that a major incident should be formally declared as soon as any of the criteria (defined at 2.1.1) are satisfied.

4.2 Police

4.2.1 The primary duty of the first Police Officer on scene is to ensure that appropriate information is passed back to their control room.

4.2.2 The mnemonic ‘SADCHALET’S’ has been devised to help:
- Survey – survey the scene on approach
- Assess – assess the situation on arrival
- Disseminate – disseminate the following information
- Casualties – casualties, approximate numbers of dead, injured and uninjured
- Hazards – hazards present and potential
- Access – best access routes for emergency vehicles
- Location – the exact location of the incident
- Emergency – emergency services and other agencies present and required
- Type – type of incident and brief details of number of vehicles, buildings, etc. involved
- Safety – all aspects of health and safety and risk assessment must be considered by all staff working at or close to the scene.

4.2.3 The officer should then:
- decide whether to declare a major incident;
- take interim charge until relieved by a more senior officer; and
- maintain contact with their control room.

4.2.4 The first officer on scene must not get personally involved in rescue work in order to fulfill the functions listed above.

4.3 Fire Brigade

4.3.1 Since the initial call to an incident may not carry sufficient information to identify the call as a major incident, the Incident Commander of the first attendance will assess the situation and report. This message will include the phrase, ‘INITIATE MAJOR INCIDENT PROCEDURE’.
4.3.2 The Incident Commander of the first attendance will take all necessary measures to:

- assess the effectiveness of firefighting or other measures carried out before his/her arrival;
- identify the risks associated with the location, including those details held on the Brigade’s Central Risks Register;
- form a plan of action to deal with the developing situation;
- decide on appropriate additional resources;
- take effective command and issue instructions to effect the plan of action;
- maintain operational command of the firefighting and rescue operations within the inner cordon;
- evaluate the situation and any potential for development, preparing to brief a more senior officer on the incident, and the police and Ambulance Service officers attending;
- liaise with other emergency service incident officers at the earliest opportunity and provide a safety briefing; and
- co-ordinate a joint hazard assessment between responding agencies and agree appropriate levels of personal protective equipment within the inner cordon.

4.4 Ambulance

4.4.1 The first member of ambulance staff will undertake the function of the Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO) prior to the arrival of an LAS officer. The second ambulance crew will also initiate control and command, parking systems and a triage sieve. The following procedures should be adopted:

- report arrival on scene to Emergency Operations Centre;
- confirm and/or declare a major incident;
- liaise with other emergency service incident officers;
- provide EOC with a detailed situation report (use CHALET or METHANE); and
- request ambulance/medical resources required pending the arrival of the AIO.

**Casualties** – casualties, approximate numbers of priority 1, 2 and 3 patients, dead and uninjured

**Hazards** – hazards present and potential

**Access** – access routes and suitable provisional rendezvous points (RVPs)

**Location** – the exact location of the incident, with map references if possible

**Emergency** – emergency services present and required including local authorities; consider medical team(s), special equipment and services, i.e. HEMS, Emergency Planning Manager, BASICS, ECV, ESV

**Type** – request number of LAS resources required. The type of incident with brief details of types and numbers of vehicles, trains, buildings, aircraft, etc. or
4.4 Actions by first officers at the scene

**Major** – major Incident declared (or hospitals to stand by)

**Exact** – exact location of the incident, with map references if possible

**Type** – the type of incident with brief details of types and numbers of vehicles, trains, buildings, aircraft, etc.

**Hazard** – hazards, present and potential

**Access** – access routes and suitable provisional rendezvous points (RVPs)

**Numbers** – approximate **numbers** of priority, 2 and 3 patients, dead and injured

**Emergency** – emergency services present and required including local authorities.

Consider medical team(s), special equipment and services, i.e. HEMS, Emergency Planning Manager, BASICS, ECV, ESV.

4.4.2 Vehicles that have been designated a management function by the first crew or the initial AIO must not get personally involved in rescue work.

4.4.3 The attendant of the first vehicle in attendance should act as AIO until relieved by the nominated Senior Ambulance Officer.

4.5 Medical Incident Officer (MIO)

4.5.1 This role is undertaken by a senior clinician with appropriate experience and training. The MIO is usually taken to the scene by an Ambulance Service vehicle, but is not part of the mobile medical team and should not get personally involved in rescue work.

4.5.2 The MIO has managerial responsibility for the deployment of medical and nursing staff at the scene and will liaise closely with the AIO to ensure effective management of resources.

4.5.3 Mobilisation of MIOs is the sole responsibility of the Ambulance Service. The LAS maintains an MIO Pool and will invariably deploy doctors from this group when the need for an MIO and support becomes apparent.

4.5.4 All receiving hospitals have plans for their individual response to major incidents. Each plan provides for the designation of an MIO. The LAS will mobilise MIOs from non-receiving hospitals if pool doctors are unavailable, e.g. in cases of multiple major incidents.
5. Scene management

SCENE ACCESS CONTROL
Provides focal point for support services prior to entering area.

CORDON ACCESS POINT

INNER CORDON
This secures the hazard and potential crime scene. Initially it will be cleared by police and LFB of all non-essential people.

TRAFFIC CORDON
Prevents unauthorised vehicle access to the area.

OUTER CORDON
This forms a controlled area around the inner cordon. Only vetted people have access.

Locations to be determined by wind direction where appropriate
5.1  **Cordons**

5.1.1 Cordons are established around the scene for the following reasons:

- to guard the scene;
- to protect the public;
- to control sightseers;
- to prevent unauthorised interference with the investigation; and
- to facilitate the operations of the emergency services and other agencies.

5.1.2 It should be noted that unauthorised access to the site of a major incident could jeopardise both the rescue and investigation. Access authority can be sought through Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC) Scene Access Control.

5.1.3 Three cordons will be established. This will be done by the police in consultation with other agencies (see Diagram 5, Scene management):

- inner cordon – provides immediate security of the hazard area and potential crime scene;
- outer cordon – seals off an extensive area around the inner cordon; and
- traffic cordon – set up at or beyond the outer cordon to prevent unauthorised vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.

5.1.4 In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under the Terrorism Act 2000. This includes the crossing of a police cordon.

5.1.5 For all known or suspected terrorist incidents all personnel should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices. Police will be responsible for checking rendezvous points (RVPs), marshalling areas, JESCC and cordon points for suspicious objects.

5.2  **Inner cordon**

5.2.1 Police will control all access and exit to the inner cordon through a cordon control point. This will be managed by bronze cordons.

5.2.2 London Fire Brigade (LFB) is responsible for safety management of all personnel within the inner cordon. At terrorist incidents the Counter Terrorism Command scene manager must also be consulted on safety issues.

5.2.3 When cordons are set, persons who do not have a role, or who are wearing inappropriate clothing, will be directed to leave the cordon.

5.2.4 To aid with identification of personnel authorised, suitably clothed and briefed to be in the inner cordon, the LFB inner cordon controllers and inner cordon recorders will issue armbands and record all personnel already in or entering the inner cordon.
5.2.5 The police and London Ambulance Service (LAS), working in conjunction with the LFB, will also log and verify their own service personnel entering the inner cordon. In addition, the police will log representatives from the utilities and other investigators.

5.2.6 The LFB has an emergency evacuation signal which all personnel working in the inner cordon must be aware of and respond to if the area becomes hazardous. The LFB officer will blow repeated short, sharp blasts on a whistle and declare a safe point to withdraw to.

5.2.7 Non-emergency service personnel providing assistance in the inner cordon will be directed to the appropriate command vehicle prior to going to the inner cordon.

5.3 Outer cordon

5.3.1 Police will control all access and exit points to the outer cordon. Non-emergency service personnel requiring access through the outer cordon will be vetted at the Scene Access Control Centre (see below) prior to attending the access point. It does not give access to the inner cordon.

5.3.2 The command/control vehicles of the emergency services should be positioned between the inner and outer cordons as should the RVP and marshalling area (see below).

5.4 Traffic cordon

5.4.1 The traffic cordon is established to restrict vehicle access to the area surrounding the scene.

5.4.2 Immediate action must be taken to ensure the free passage of emergency traffic to and from the scene of the incident and to prevent congestion at and around the scene.

5.4.3 All emergency, specialist and voluntary services attending the scene will be directed as follows: emergency services to the RVP initially; specialist and voluntary services to the Scene Access Control Centre for vetting prior to direction to the RVP.

5.5 Logistical support

5.5.1 The level of response to a major incident will be dependent on the nature, size and potential duration of the incident. Allocation and commitment of resources from responding agencies will therefore be scalable, depending on requirements. As such arrangements for logistical support and resources management will vary accordingly.

5.5.2 Whilst it is recognised that the location of initial RVPs and marshalling areas will be agreed following consultation between police and fire ‘Silvers’, the location of Multi-Agency Marshalling Areas and Multi-agency Holding Areas (as defined below) will only be determined following consultation between police and fire ‘Golds’.

5.5.3 The following generic definitions describe areas/locations used to support logistical/resource management at major incidents.
5.6  **Rendezvous point**

5.6.1 A point to which in the first instance all emergency and specialist services may be directed prior to deployment to the scene of operations or to a designated marshalling area.

5.6.2 This will normally be established within the outer cordon and will be under the control of a Police Officer wearing the appropriate reflective tabard.

5.6.3 The Police Officer will advise the appropriate service command vehicle of the resources arriving. Any not immediately required will be directed to the marshalling area.

5.6.4 It must be noted that the RVP plaque displayed at London Underground stations is for the use of London Underground and LFB staff only. It is not an RVP for the purposes set out above.

5.7  **Marshalling area**

5.7.1 A marshalling area, controlled by police with the assistance of the Fire service, wearing appropriate reflective tabards, should be established between the RVP and the scene. The actual location will be agreed after consultation between the police and fire ‘Silvers’. The LAS would not usually be included within a marshalling area due to the arrival and departure of ambulance resources through ambulance parking and loading areas.

5.7.2 This area is for resources not immediately required at the scene or which, having served their purpose, are being held for future use. It should, therefore, be an area suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles.

5.7.3 Marshalling areas may also be used to provide briefing/debriefing areas and recuperation for personnel involved in arduous work at the scene.

5.7.4 As the event is scaled down, the utilities and other contractors may need to maintain the marshalling area for the duration of the recovery phase.

5.8  **Multi-Agency Marshalling Area (MAMA)**

5.8.1 Where the size and nature of an incident is far greater than a conventional major incident, a multi-agency marshalling area may be required to accommodate the significant level of resources and logistical support required to sustain operations at the incident. This may include feeding, rest and recuperation, first aid, occupational health, equipment storage and service.

5.8.2 Multi-Agency Marshalling Areas will only be established following consultation between Emergency Service ‘Golds’.

5.9  **Multi-Agency Holding Area (MAHA)**

5.9.1 The nature and duration of an incident may also require the establishment of a holding area to reserve additional resources (primarily emergency service) prior to deployment directly to the scene of operations, to a designated MAMA, or to support service provision to areas.
not directly affected by the incident. MAHAs should be areas suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles and should provide additional facilities including feeding/welfare, co-ordination, administration and briefing.

5.9.2 Multi-agency Holding Areas will only be established following consultation between Emergency Service ‘Golds’.

5.10 Joint Emergency Services Control Centre

5.10.1 The LFB, police and LAS control/command vehicles will form the focus from which the major incident will be managed. These vehicles, together with those of the public utilities and local authority, will be located close to one another and be known collectively as the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC). The incident officers (Silvers) will jointly exercise their authority from this point in a co-ordinated manner.

5.10.2 The importance of this joint control function should not be underestimated. The experience of previous major incidents has demonstrated the benefits derived by the establishment of close contact between the emergency services and other agencies involved in the management of the incident.

5.11 Siting of vehicles

5.11.1 The officer in charge of the first command/control vehicle on scene should make allowance for the siting of other emergency service command vehicles.

5.11.2 The site should:

- have enough space to accommodate all anticipated agency controls;
- be away from the hazards of the scene, but close enough to maintain control over it; and
- be chosen carefully as relocation may prove extremely difficult.

5.11.3 Ideally the site would be served with good access, lighting and toilets. Realistically this will be unusual in operational terms. A wide thoroughfare or surface car park may be used as the JESCC in the absence of more suitable accommodation.

5.11.4 The advice of the LFB on matters of fire safety will be sought by the other emergency services in connection with the placement of the JESCC. This advice may well be changed if the incident subsequently proves to involve chemicals or other hazardous materials. The choice of site would then be influenced by wind direction, strength and gradients. In this event, the LFB scientific advisor (and if available on site, safety personnel) will advise on the most suitable location for the JESCC. The LFB geographic information system is available on command vehicles and may also be used to determine a suitable site.

5.11.5 The police Silver will, having consulted with the other emergency services, be responsible for confirming or amending the siting of the command/control vehicles and will establish liaison between them.
The LFB or LAS will usually set up the inter-agency (Matel or field phone system) link between the command/control vehicles. Although vehicles should be positioned close enough to ensure efficient liaison and co-ordination, their proximity must not impair good radio communications. About 10 metres’ separation is ideal.

If a service mobilises more than one control/command vehicle to the scene, only one of these will perform the control function at the JESCC.

To aid identification, the blue, red or green identifying lights on each of the main control vehicles of the emergency services will be switched on. The identifying lights on all other vehicles must be switched off, except during incidents on open motorways or elsewhere where they are necessary to avoid accidents.

### Scene Access Control (SAC)

A SAC Centre must be established outside the outer cordon, if possible in an area adjacent to the RVP. The centre, which will be under police command, must be clearly identifiable to those wishing to gain entry through the outer cordon. If necessary, an approach route must be established and signposted.

The SAC will be responsible for checking the authenticity of non-emergency service personnel whose presence is required within the outer cordon and beyond. Such persons should be directed to the SAC in the first instance by the authority requesting their attendance.

The SAC must maintain a record of all persons who have been directed to them in order to gain access and will need to establish a link with the JESCC for this purpose at an early stage. If possible, the SAC will establish communication links with the JESCC by way of telephone, radio and fax.

Once satisfied as to their credentials the SAC staff will, where appropriate, escort them to the RVP.

It must be emphasised that the role of the SAC is to facilitate entry through the outer cordon by non-emergency service personnel whose presence is required. It does not replace the arrangements in place in relation to control of and entry to the inner cordon.
6. **Command and control**

6.1 **Initial control**

6.1.1 It is possible that early on in the incident members of one service will spontaneously carry out tasks normally the responsibility of another. As soon as sufficient staff arrive, each service can be expected to establish unequivocal command and control of functions for which it is normally responsible.

6.1.2 It should be understood that the titles do not convey seniority of service or rank, but depict the function carried out by that particular person. From the outset it is important that the senior officers of each service at the scene liaise with each other. This will be the foundation upon which all later meetings will be based.

6.2 **Gold, Silver and Bronze**

6.2.1 ‘Gold’, ‘Silver’ and ‘Bronze’ are titles of functions adopted by each of the emergency services and are role-related, not rank-related. These functions are equivalent to those described as ‘strategic’, ‘tactical’ and ‘operational’ in other documents about emergency procedures. In summary the roles of each can be described as follows.

6.3 **Gold (strategic)**

6.3.1 Gold is the commander in overall charge of each service, responsible for formulating the strategy for the incident. Each Gold has overall command of the resources of their own organisation, but delegates tactical decisions to their respective Silver(s).

6.3.2 At the outset of the incident Gold will determine the strategy and record a strategy statement. This will need to be monitored and subject to ongoing review.

6.4 **Silver (tactical)**

6.4.1 Silver will attend the scene, take charge and be responsible for formulating the tactics to be adopted by their service to achieve the strategy set by Gold. Silver should not become personally involved with activities close to the incident, but remain detached.

6.5 **Bronze (operational)**

6.5.1 Bronze will control and deploy the resources of their respective service within a geographical sector or specific role and implement the tactics defined by Silver.

6.5.2 As the incident progresses and more resources attend the RVP, the level of supervision will increase in proportion. As senior managers arrive they will be assigned functions within the Gold, Silver and Bronze structure.

6.5.3 Senior officers arriving at their respective command/control vehicles are to establish contact with their incident commanders and should also make contact with the police Silver in order to notify any transfer of command.

6.5.4 It is important that the title holder wears a uniquely identifiable tabard and passes it on to their successor.
Command and control

6.5.5 By using this universal structure, the emergency services will be able to communicate with each other and understand each other’s functions and authority.

6.6 Inter-agency resources

6.6.1 Any service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In these circumstances, while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the other service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times.

6.6.2 Personnel from one service who help another in this way should only be given tasks for which they are trained and not simply supplement the other service in a potentially dangerous situation. For instance, Police Officers may be directed to become stretcher-bearers to release firefighters for rescue work. They should not undertake hazardous rescue work themselves.
7. Gold and Silver co-ordinating groups

7.1 General

7.1.1 The formation of both a Gold and Silver co-ordinating group has been of great value at all major incidents. The supervising officers of each of the services will initially be fully occupied with their own sphere of activity and there will, inevitably, be some delay in a co-ordinating group being set up, but this should be kept to a minimum.

7.1.2 It is essential that the first supervising officers on scene from each of the emergency services liaise closely with each other at the earliest opportunity.

7.1.3 These officers may be invited to the first Silver co-ordinating group meeting to describe their initial decisions or they will brief their representative on the group before the meeting.

7.1.4 It is important, when agencies send a representative to either a Gold or Silver coordinating group meeting, that the person has sufficient authority to guarantee that the facilities they offer on behalf of their service will be delivered.

7.1.5 On the other hand, it is useful if only one person from each service attends so that the meetings are not unduly long.

7.1.6 Minutes, or a note of decisions taken, must be kept of all meetings of the co-ordinating groups. It is also essential that individual members of the group make their own notes of meetings.

7.1.7 Minutes, or a note of decisions taken and personal notes, should provide an aide-mémoire of the continuing overall progress of the operation. They will provide a perspective against which decisions or priorities can be made.

7.1.8 A major incident will necessarily involve an investigation as to its cause and quite possibly a formal inquest, inquiry or criminal trial. The actions of the senior officers of the emergency services will be of considerable interest. Therefore notes will be invaluable and will, insofar as they are relevant, be disclosable; that is, made available in subsequent proceedings.

7.2 Gold co-ordinating group

7.2.1 In response to a ‘major incident’ the initial Gold Co-ordinating Group will consist primarily of the ‘blue light’ emergency services. Additional Gold level representation from other agencies will be dependent upon the requirements of the incident (e.g. nature, scale and dynamics). The London Resilience Team (LRT) will be notified of all formally declared major incidents that meet the LESLP definition.

7.2.2 Where the size and nature of the incident is far greater than a conventional major incident, it may be appropriate to convene immediate and full strategic representation from the London resilience partnership (the regional tier). This would be considered appropriate where, from the outset, it is apparent that there is the requirement for prolonged and significant input from all partner agencies. This level of strategic co-ordination will be accommodated through the opening of a Strategic Co-ordination Centre.
Gold and Silver co-ordinating groups

7.2.3 Representatives

**Police** (who will chair the meeting)
- overall incident commander (Police Gold);
- minute taker;
- senior identification manager/senior investigating officer where applicable;
- safety advisor; and
- press advisor.

**Fire**
- overall Incident Commander (Fire Gold).

**Ambulance**
- overall Incident Commander (Gold Medic).

**Local authority**
- Chief Executive (or appointed representative) of the affected borough.

7.2.4 Location of meetings

The Gold group will normally meet at a location completely detached from the scene with suitable communications and meeting facilities.

7.2.5 Frequency of meetings

In general the nature and difficulties of the incident will govern the frequency of Gold meetings.

7.2.6 Tasks

The agenda for the Gold co-ordinating group meetings will be decided by the group at the time and will depend upon the type and scale of the incident. At the outset the Gold group will determine the strategic issues relevant to the incident. In addition, the group may provide liaison with central government and other bodies, ensure that sufficient support and resources are available at the incident and maintain a strategic overview. Coupled with this will be visits made by VIPs to the scene and to injured survivors. These visits place additional strain on the operation in terms of security, public order, increased media attention and interruption to normal rescue functions. Police Gold will undertake the planning and liaison role for these visits.
7.3 **Silver co-ordinating group**

7.3.1 **Representatives**

**Police** (who will chair the meeting)

- Incident Officer (Police Silver);
- Senior identification manager/senior investigating officer/scene evidence recovery manager, where applicable;
- Minute taker;
- Safety advisor; and
- Press advisor.

**Fire**

Incident Commander (Fire Silver);

- LFB inter-agency liaison officer;
- Scientific advisor, where applicable; and
- Press advisor.

**Ambulance**

Incident officer (Silver Medic);

- Medical Incident Officer;
- Press advisor; and
- Emergency Planning Manager or CBRN Tactical Support Officer where applicable.

**Local authority**

- Local Authority Liaison Officer.

**Other**

- The Silver group should consider a formal agenda to monitor the progress of actions for the Silver meetings;
- Additional representation will depend upon the scale of the incident. It may be necessary to have an inner core of permanent members and an outer group of advisors, specialists and others who could be called upon to attend as necessary; and
- Dependent on the nature of the incident and industry affected, consideration should be given to the specialist knowledge and expertise available to assist the group. Individuals are available from industry who may be able to make important contributions to aid a co-ordinated and effective response to the incident and to the tactical decision-making process.
Gold and Silver co-ordinating groups

7.3.2 Location of meetings

For convenience the Silver co-ordinating group should initially meet close to the scene; it may be moved to premises which are better served, although further from the scene, as operations progress.

7.3.3 Frequency of meetings

The police Incident Officer will call an initial meeting of the Silver co-ordinating group at the earliest reasonable opportunity. Subsequent meetings of this group can be arranged at this first meeting or may be called by the Police Incident Officer at the request of another member of the group.

7.3.4 Safety

At incidents concerned with fire, the danger of fire, or involving rescue, the LFB will provide the Silver group with professional advice on matters of safety. Whilst the LFB will give professional advice on safety, overall responsibility for health and safety rests with each emergency service. Consideration should also be given to the advice and expertise that may be available from industries directly involved in the disaster. Also, the Health and Safety Executive, as well as being an investigative body, is able to give advice on safety matters.

7.3.5 Situation reports

Each service should briefly describe the situation as it affects its own operations and, if necessary, mention those matters for which it requires the assistance or co-operation of others.

7.3.6 Priorities

Priorities are essential to create a cohesive joint strategy. This will indicate how the resources available can be deployed in the most effective and efficient manner. Each service will have objectives to meet within its own area of responsibility. It is important to establish which of these should have priority at the particular stage the incident has reached. In that way, inter-service difficulties may be avoided and each may concentrate upon those actions which contribute most to the success of the operation.

7.3.7 Future developments

This group should give consideration to the requirements of later phases of the operation, including the identification of actions that need to be taken in advance.
8. **Communications systems**

8.1 **General**

8.1.1 All parties are introducing TETRA-based radios with joint communications interoperability. The intention is to work towards its full implementation. It is, however, useful to be aware of the various types of communications employed by each constituent member that currently remain in place.

8.2 **Warning**

8.2.1 No communications system is secure from eavesdroppers. Radio scanners capable of receiving Police, Fire Brigade, Ambulance and local authority radio transmissions are readily available. Similarly, fax scanners can be quickly brought to the scene to intercept information transmitted between the services and agencies. This should be borne in mind when wording any transmission, including cellular telephone conversations, which may contain sensitive information.

8.3 **Terrorism**

8.3.1 At known or suspected terrorist incidents radios should be kept on. The obvious benefits in being able to communicate at a major incident far outweigh the remote risk of activating a device through radio transmission. When a suspect explosive device has been located personnel should withdraw to a safe distance of at least 15 metres from the device before transmitting on personal radios. This distance should be increased to 50 metres when vehicle-based radios are used.

8.3.2 It should be borne in mind that GSM digital telephones and some trunk radio systems permanently transmit as part of their normal operating procedure. When a device is discovered these items should be disconnected and not activated until they are outside the 50-metre zone mentioned above.

8.4 **City of London Police (COLP)**

8.4.1 The COLP has a major incident vehicle equipped with:

- COLP multi-channel UHF set;
- Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) multi-channel UHF set;
- public address system;
- cellphones; and
- loudhailers.

8.4.2 The COLP force control room has all the computer hardware common to many computer-aided despatch systems found in all service headquarters. This is assisted by the monitoring of events on strategically placed cameras within central London and relayed to screens within the control room.
Communications systems

8.5 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

8.5.1 The MPS communication system comprises the Metcall Operation Command Unit based at three locations. This has the ability to communicate with the Integrated Borough Operations rooms, MPS vehicles and foot patrol officers. The MPS computer aided dispatch system is compatible with that of the City of London Police. Metcall has the capability to receive camera coverage of almost the entire inner London traffic network, which has now been enhanced so that the MPS can also receive images from each of the local authority CCTV systems. The MPS helicopter can provide live and recorded videos of an incident anywhere in London which can be downloaded to certain ‘remote’ sites when applicable.

8.5.2 There is a centrally based mobile communications vehicle (MCV) that is fitted with radios and cellphones and that can be speedily deployed to a scene staffed by Central Communications Centre staff.

8.5.3 There are also major incident (Silver control) vehicles, each situated at strategic locations around London. They are equipped similarly to the COLP vehicle and can accommodate a small briefing group. Area officers will staff them. In addition, there are Bronze command vehicles throughout London.

8.5.4 In the MPS TETRA-based radio is fitted to vehicles and issued to individual officers. Differing talkgroups are used for local borough operational command units and pan-London units, but all can communicate with each other if required. Whilst MPS radios do not operate underground there is a facility to provide cross-agency interoperability.

8.6 British Transport Police (BTP)

8.6.1 The BTP control room has its own command and control system. In addition the BTP also has direct access to MPS CAD and is CAD-live. There is CCTV capacity available within the MICC.

8.6.2 BTP uses TETRA-based radio throughout the country. When officers are ‘below ground’ on the underground system they use Channel 2 radios to communicate with MICC.

8.6.3 A full TETRA-based radio communications system is not being implemented in deep tube stations until 2008. The Duty Officer MICC has details of call-out procedures (via MPS) should airwave be required in the event of an emergency under ground. This capability and procedure for deploying is known as ‘Operation Tunnel Sound’.

8.6.4 Two incident command vehicles are available in the London area and additional command and control capacity can be brought in from outside London if required.

8.7 London Fire Brigade (LFB)

8.7.1 All LFB front-line appliances are equipped with VHF radios and have the ability to communicate with the control from anywhere in the Greater London area. The LFB has hand-held UHF radios available on all its front-line appliances together with an additional
supply on command vehicles for command purposes. These radios are compatible with 'leaky-feeder' systems currently being installed in LU sub-surface railway stations and certain other underground locations.

8.7.2 As well as main VHF radio, LFB command vehicles also carry the following communication facilities:

- TETRA radio communications;
- 'Matel' field telephones, which are compatible with those in the other emergency service control vehicles. These are available for use at major incidents for liaison purposes and for establishing communications with control vehicles;
- a mobile leaky-feed cable capable of being laid into areas of bad VHF reception;
- cellphones, which are available for alternative communication purposes;
- cellular faxes; and
- downlink image receivers (helicopter).

8.7.3 All command vehicles are equipped with computers and are staffed by personnel trained in the use of the Command Planning System (CPS) software. The CPS is an interactive software package based on OS maps that is designed to assist incident management.

8.7.4 All major incidents and incidents of note are monitored in the Brigade Command Support Centre (CSC), which also deals with liaison and other issues specific to major incidents. CSC personnel are able to view the CPS and input information to support incident commanders on the command vehicles, whilst also being able to overview the CPS incident management.

8.8 London Ambulance Service (LAS)

8.8.1 LAS emergency ambulances, response cars and other vehicles are fitted with cellphones, VHF radios, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and an Automatic Vehicle Location System (AVLS) through mobile data terminals on each vehicle. All LAS resources are fitted with VHF radios channeled into the Emergency Operations Centre at the Ambulance Headquarters at Waterloo. The LAS have a duplicate fallback control room at Bow.

8.8.2 The duty officer vehicles are fitted with cellphones, VHF radios and hand-held UHF radios for use by LAS Bronze officers at the scene.

8.8.3 The LAS have two emergency control vehicles. These vehicles are painted white and bear the London Ambulance Service markings. They are surmounted by blue flashing lights and a green and white chequered, illuminated dome. A green and white chequered strip is displayed around the vehicle. Each vehicle has multi-channel radio sets netted to all ambulance frequencies, hand portables, a mobile leaky-feed cable capable of providing UHF communications in bad areas of reception, maps and other sources of information. They also have the facility to set up a direct line telephone link between the emergency services at the scene of an incident. They also have a facility to link into British Telecom phone lines. A mobile phone and fax is fitted in each vehicle. Each vehicle also has a UHF radio set with Multi-Agency Command channel 69/70 for use by Silver Officers at major incidents.
8.8.4 **LAS Incident Control**

LAS Incident Control is the control room situated within the EOC complex for use during serious and major incidents. It is responsible for controlling the incident, communication with hospitals, primary logging duties, paging instruction procedures and the strategic overview of the incident.

8.9 **MPS Special Operations Room (MP-SOR)**

8.9.1 The Special Operations Room (SOR call sign “GT”) has provided command and control for numerous major incidents that have occurred in London within recent years. It is part of the Metcall Operational Command Unit.

8.9.2 SOR (GT) provides command and control for major incidents, terrorist incidents, disorder and demonstrations. The room has consoles that are set aside for the LAS, LFB, BTP, COLP and additional agencies (for example armed forces). It is from here that the various service liaison officers work. They have access to all the radio and CAD communications channelled through the room and can, for example, relay requests for assistance to their own control rooms.

8.9.3 SOR (GT) does not control the incident. Its function is to provide a support structure to the Incident Command, to assist in the management of the incident. It cannot be over-emphasised that the best operational communications will always be conducted verbally between service representatives on site.

8.9.4 Within Central Command Complex there are also facilities for communicating with all other police forces in the United Kingdom, members of Interpol and central government.

8.10 **Inter-agency command channel**

8.10.1 The MPS, LAS and LFB command vehicles that attend the scene are each equipped with a number of hand-held multi-channel UHF radios. These will operate on the inter-agency command channel using Channels 69 and 70 (National Channel Plan). These radios are intended for command use only by the respective service Silvers for liaison purposes and not for general inter-service use. Police are responsible for issuing the radios to the other services at the scene.

8.11 **Liaison officers**

8.11.1 Each agency will on request provide liaison officers to the Gold co-ordinating group.

8.11.2 In addition the LFB has a cadre of dedicated trained and qualified inter-agency liaison officers who can advise and support incident commanders, police, medical, military and other government agencies on the LFB’s operational capacity and capability to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at which a brigade attendance may be required. The LAS has a similar system, with a group of emergency planning managers and CBRN tactical support officers who can provide advice and support to the Ambulance Incident Officers and others on matters relating to emergency planning and other ambulance service or NHS requirements.
**Local authority communications**

Many local authorities are provided with their own integral radio communications systems; however, these may not be compatible between boroughs or with the emergency services. London local authorities are undertaking to procure common communications systems, including Airwave, to ensure compatibility with the emergency services. All local authorities have emergency satellite phones.

**Telecom assistance**

Telecommunication utility companies have a range of alternative communication systems for use by the emergency services. Charges may be incurred.

**Access overload control (ACCOLC)**

This is the authorised scheme whereby the mobile telephony service providers can, in the event of a major incident, limit access to their respective networks and permit emergency services, local authorities and other users with suitably enabled mobile telephones to have exclusive access to available channels.

This facility is expensive to implement and can cause inconvenience to other responders, such as Transport for London. It should only be initiated after careful consideration and on the authority of police Gold. In an extreme or urgent situation police Silver may request the implementation of ACCOLC.

The system works by using ACCOLC-enabled SIM cards. The SIM cards are supplied by the respective service providers. Individual emergency service organisations should consult their own policy in relation to the numbers of ACCOLC-enabled telephones they can obtain. As a guide each organisation should take into consideration key posts to be supplied with ACCOLC-enabled SIM cards.

It should be noted that the Cabinet Office is the authorising body for ACCOLC registration and the number allowed on the scheme is strictly limited to preserve its operational benefits.

**Radio Amateurs’ Emergency Network (RAYNET)**

RAYNET is a nationwide voluntary group of United Kingdom government-licensed radio operators who are able to provide emergency radio communications to the emergency services, local authorities and central government departments. Their radio communications equipment is specifically designated for use in emergencies.

Greater London RAYNET can provide specialist VHF/UHF radio communications assistance across London and beyond into neighbouring counties. National and international radio communications can also be provided if requested.

The assistance of RAYNET should be sought from the appropriate service control.
9. Casualty clearance

9.1 Categories

9.1.1 The care and identification of casualties is a primary responsibility of the emergency services at a major incident.

9.1.2 Casualties fall into one of four categories:
   - uninjured;
   - injured;
   - dead; or
   - evacuees.

9.1.2 They may be witnesses/victims or even suspects and carry evidence or hazards on their clothing, particularly in terrorist incidents.

9.2 Uninjured

9.2.1 The uninjured will have been involved in the incident, but will not necessarily want or require medical attention. They must be removed from the hazard by the London Fire Brigade (LFB). Once these people have been removed from any hazards and processed through a triage sieve by the LAS they must be handed over to the police for collation of details and witness statements.

9.2.2 They will all be potential witnesses. The police will need to collate their details for the benefit of the casualty bureau as well as the investigation. This can be done at suitable premises nearby, called the survivor reception centre (see 9.7).

9.3 Injured

9.3.1 The injured need to be rescued from the scene and cared for as quickly and safely as possible by the rescuers, who must be mindful of the requirement of the ambulance and medical teams on site. Ambulance paramedics and technicians then need to be able to administer the appropriate pre-hospital treatment before the patients are taken to the receiving hospitals.

9.3.2 The LAS’s aim at any multiple casualty incident is to produce the largest number of survivors. They will need to deliver the right patient to the right place at the right time so that they receive the optimum treatment. Triage is a dynamic continuous process. The LAS has a responsibility to ensure that at every stage of the incident patients are continually assessed to ensure that changes in the condition of the patient are reflected in the patient’s triage category.

9.3.3 The triage system is a ‘physiological system’ which relies on changes in vital signs as a result of an injury or illness rather than an ‘anatomical system’ that relies on decisions being made on what injuries can be seen. Where an experienced clinician is using the triage system, knowledge of the clinical condition that is based on an anatomical injury may be used to upgrade a triage category.
During an incident the LAS will use two levels of triage – these are referred to as ‘triage sieve’ and ‘triage sort’. Both triage systems use algorithms to determine which priority group a patient falls into. The priority groups are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Description</th>
<th>Colour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgent</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delayed</td>
<td>Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expectant Blue</td>
<td>Blue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead or Deceased</td>
<td>White  or Black</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This triage sieve quickly sorts out casualties into priority groups. Using the algorithm card the LAS will systematically work through the patients, triaging and labelling them. The LAS will not get involved in substantive patient treatment during a triage sieve.

On the arrival of further resources patients are moved to a place of safety, usually the casualty clearing station. At this location they can be re-triaged using a triage sort process. This process is a more thorough clinical triage than the sieve.

The same triage card is used throughout the sieve and sort process updating a patient’s triage category by refolding the card as necessary.

During most major incidents the LAS triages paediatrics using the adult triage sieve – this over-prioritises but is a safe option. During a multiple casualty incident involving mainly paediatric patients the LAS will instigate the use of the paediatric triage process. The system uses similar algorithms to that of the adult triage tape.

The expectant category is only used with the authority of Gold Medic and Gold Doctor with advice from the Emergency Planning Managers. This situation would arise when there are such large numbers of patients that the ability of the LAS to respond to the clinical needs of every individual and potentially unsurvivable injuries would be to the detriment of other patients.

Expectant patients must be triage labelled as ‘immediate priority 1’, which is red, though with a blue flash corner folded back from the rear of the immediate priority 1 card.
Casualty clearing station and ambulance loading point

9.3.11 The casualty clearing station is a place of relative safety to which casualties are conveyed from the incident site. Triage sort, assessment, treatment and stabilisation is carried out by LAS staff together with any mobile medical teams on scene at the station. The casualty clearing station is co-ordinated by the LAS Bronze Clearing officer and a senior doctor (secondary triage officer), call sign Bronze Doctor.

9.3.12 A suitable area or building between the inner and outer cordons near to the site should be identified for use as the casualty clearing station.

9.3.13 Once enough resources have arrived on scene it is vital that patient documentation starts within the casualty clearing station.

Hospital

9.3.14 Once the patient arrives at the hospital the patient will be re-triaged by hospital staff. The ambulance crew must ensure that they report their arrival with both CAC and the Ambulance Liaison Officer (ALO) at the hospital. The ALO has a responsibility to retrieve every patient’s LAS triage card and pass details to the police documentation teams.

Labelling and documentation

9.3.15 Documentation of patients must start as soon as possible. Triage labels must be attached to patients in the initial stages of the incident even if there is no opportunity to collect personal details. Details of each patient should be collected as soon as they enter the casualty clearing station/area.

9.3.16 It may not always be possible for ambulance crews to record the usual details of patients carried on the patient report forms. Ambulances should not be delayed at the scene in order to obtain personal details of individual casualties, which will be obtained by the police at the receiving hospitals. In all circumstances the triage label must be completed.

9.3.17 Police service instructions refer to the attaching of nationally and recommended identification labels to deceased persons. Ambulance service personnel should note that these identity and evidential labels are NOT to be used in place of the medical triage labels.

9.3.18 Police should liaise with the LAS to maintain a count of all persons processed with details of hospitals to which they have been taken.

9.3.19 Police officers will be deployed to the casualty departments of these hospitals to provide documentation teams, assist with forensic issues and provide security advice.
9.4 Deceased and human remains

9.4.1 The Coroner

An HM Coroner will be appointed appropriate to ‘where the body lies’, and it is the Coroner who has the ultimate responsibility for establishing identity and the cause and time of death. It is important that the Coroner or his/her Officer be kept informed at all time. The Coroner may wish to view the deceased or human remains in situ prior to recovery. In a multi-scene incident, where the deceased lie in a number of different Coroners’ areas, consideration should be given to the appointment of a ‘Lead Coroner’ by recorded agreement.

9.4.2 The Pathologist

A Home Office Pathologist will be appointed to provide post-mortem information relating to the cause of death and the identity of the deceased. Forensic specialists will assist the pathologist.

The Pathologist may wish to view the deceased and human remains in situ prior to recovery. Coroners are assisted in their efforts by Home Office pathologists and forensic scientists of many disciplines. Police Officers will make enquiries on their behalf.

9.4.3 Senior Identification Manager (SIM)

Police Gold will appoint a SIM. The SIM, in consultation with the Senior Investigation Officer (SIO), will determine terms of reference to be agreed by Gold, and will normally assume responsibility for the key areas of the identification process, which include the casualty bureau, family liaison, disaster victim recovery and identification teams and mortuary teams.

9.4.4 Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM)

Established to provide a single point of contact at the scene responsible to the SIM for the recovery of the deceased and human remains, and to the SIO for crime scene technical and physical investigation evidence. Part of this role will be to chair, and to provide minutes, of the SERM Group meetings.

9.4.5 SERM Group

Relevant multi-agency and specialist advisors who will assist in the recovery programme. Some of these will have statutory powers to conduct investigations (e.g. AAIB and RAIB); others will provide technical assistance and advice (e.g. heavy gear lifting operators or deconstruction engineers) as well as representatives from the private industry-nominated persons (e.g. transportation operators, site owners or the like). Consideration should be given to the needs of the investigation and consultation with the SIO as these persons may have a conflict of interest. The deceased and human remains should not be moved unless essential in the life-saving process.
9.4.6 Disaster Victim Recovery and Identification Officers

Disaster Victim Recovery and Identification Teams (DVRITs) are drawn from a select list of specially trained officers. They are deployed by the SIM in consultation with the Coroner and Pathologist to recover the deceased and human remains in a respectful and dignified manner appropriate to the requirements of the investigation as directed by the SERM. The deceased and human remains will be recovered to a nationally agreed standard and recorded using the ACPO victim label booklet which provides for continuity of evidence relating to the movement and storage of those recovered from the scene. Property, unless 'with the body', will not be dealt with by the DVRIT but will be collected under a separate process.

9.4.7 Holding audit area

The DVRIT leader will be responsible for establishing a ‘Holding Audit Area’ within the inner cordon close to the recovery area where all aspects of the recovery process will be co-ordinated. Holding Audit Area officers will provide a direct link to the SERM in respect of information relating to the recovery and continuity process including onward transportation to the mortuary. Police will deploy continuity officers to vehicles used in the transportation.

9.4.8 Property

Property which may be evidence, or other material which may be relevant to both the investigation and the identification procedures, should be recovered in a systematic and organised manner, appropriately logged, recorded and stored. The SERM will be responsible for appointing a property recovery team leader drawn from police specialist search teams. Exhibit storage should be established on-site, managed by dedicated exhibits officers/teams.

9.4.9 Designated mortuaries/emergency (demountable structure) mortuaries

Local authorities have a duty to provide mortuary facilities, these can be divided into two main types:

- designated, existing local mortuary facilities
- emergency (demountable structure) mortuaries.

9.4.10 Should designated mortuaries be overrun or unable to adequately cope with the incident then the Coroner, Pathologist and SIM may request the local authority to provide additional emergency mortuary facilities. The Home Office National Emergency Mortuary Plan and the London Mass Fatality Plan exist to help drive that decision-making process and the implementation of such a decision.

9.4.11 Sites for the construction of an emergency mortuary have been identified within the London Mass Fatality Plan. DVRITs and exhibits officers will be deployed to the mortuary to assist in the identification procedures and will report to the police Mortuary Operations Manager.
9.5  Evacuees

9.5.1 Some emergencies may require the evacuation of a large surrounding area because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards. Care must be taken to ensure that evacuation does not place those concerned in greater danger.

9.5.2 Evacuation is usually undertaken on the advice of the Fire Silver. In some circumstances, personnel from all services may have to assist in carrying it out.

9.5.3 A suitable evacuation assembly point will need to be established and rest centres set up by the local authority.

9.5.4 Personnel from the local authority and from voluntary agencies will staff rest centres. The centres will provide security, welfare, communication, catering and medical facilities.

9.5.5 Evacuees should be documented and basic details passed to the casualty bureau.

9.6  Rest centre

9.6.1 The selection of a suitable rest centre should always be made in conjunction with the local authority where practicable, as there may already be pre-defined facilities in the area affected.

9.6.2 A rest centre is a facility where persons displaced by a major incident of any size can find shelter, support and sustenance as appropriate.

9.6.3 Personnel from the local authority, primary care trust and voluntary agencies will staff rest centres as appropriate. The rest centres will provide security, welfare, communication, catering and medical facilities.

9.6.4 Facilities with a specific reception role for survivors and or friends and relatives are detailed below.

9.6.5 In addition to providing facilities for the documentation teams, the centre also needs to provide shelter, first-aid treatment, welfare support and communications. The voluntary aid societies may also be present to supply comfort and counselling.

9.7  Survivor reception centre (SRC)

9.7.1 In the early stages of an incident, where those involved are leaving the scene, it may not be practicable to establish an SRC because of other more pressing primary responsibilities, e.g. life-saving.

9.7.2 Those who have been involved in the incident may be able to provide important information/evidence in relation to the event. Where practicable, survivors and witnesses should be directed to the SRC. Here investigators can begin to interview witnesses and
forensic managers can assist with the collection of evidence. Police will supply a documentation team, who will pass on details to the Central Casualty Bureau. A police security team will also be deployed at the centre.

9.7.3 The importance of the above comments cannot be over-emphasized.

9.8 **Friends' and relatives' reception centre**

9.8.1 Where demand warrants it, consideration should be given to establishing a secure, comfortable area where friends and relatives of casualties and missing persons can be directed for information.

9.8.2 The size and scale of the incident, number of fatalities and possibly the area of destruction will affect any decisions made. Within the area to be set aside for the friends’ and relatives’ reception centre, consideration should be given to locating the relevant agencies whose advice and assistance may be called upon.

9.8.3 There will be a need to ensure that the resources of all those working towards the needs of family and friends are co-ordinated and that there are regular briefings to ensure a cohesive approach is established.

9.9 **Central Casualty Bureau**

9.9.1 Police may establish a casualty bureau where details of all dead, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. This centre will also take telephone enquiries from the friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident.

9.9.2 Casualty bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries.

9.9.3 Where a match is made, appropriate contact with the enquirer will be made.

9.9.4 The casualty bureau will not close until all the casualties have been identified, all next-of-kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.

9.9.5 To avoid discrepancies in casualty figures all information must be routed through the casualty bureau, which will be the sole source of casualty information. Casualty figures must only be released following consultation with Police Gold or their press officers.

9.9.6 Where injuries are fatal or serious, contact should be made with the family liaison officer co-ordinator to discuss whether it is appropriate to appoint a family liaison officer at this stage.
10. **Helicopters**

10.1 **Police helicopters**

10.1.1 The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), City of London Police (COLP) operate helicopters over the whole of the Greater London area.

- Their aircraft have the following equipment:
  - comprehensive radio communications, including air traffic control waveband to ease communications with other emergency response aircraft;
  - visual and thermal imaging equipment, effective day and night;
  - a searchlight ('Nitesun') capable of illuminating a wide area and for immediate rescue needs, operating at 800 feet for minimal ground disturbance;
  - a public address system ('Skyshout') capable of broadcasting messages at a lower operating height;
  - video transmission equipment to ground-based receiving stations which include both MPS and London Fire Brigade (LFB) command vehicles. Mobile receivers are also available which in certain circumstances can be delivered close to the scene by the aircraft or collected from the base; and
  - digital and wet-film stills cameras.

10.1.2 Helicopters can provide the following support facilities:

- immediate overview of scene, including the size of the affected area, ancillary factors and so on;
- casualty search/assessment of numbers;
- identification of present or potential hazards;
- weather conditions, including wind direction at scene;
- area containment, including cordon deployment/infringement;
- traffic management/route planning schemes; and
- evidential imagery of scene, including photographs, video, thermal imaging and detailed target analysis.

10.2 **Military helicopters**

10.2.1 RAF Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters are available to respond to civil incidents and could, for example, assist in the transfer of urgent casualties to hospitals outside London if this were necessary. These helicopters are equipped to winch survivors from the sea or river and can carry several stretcher cases. They can conduct searches visually and by using radar and infra-red equipment.

10.2.2 The nearest RAF SAR helicopter base to London is at Wattisham in Suffolk, about 40–45 minutes’ reaction and flying time from central London. The presence of suitable landing sites adjacent to the incident is a prerequisite for casualty evacuation.
RAFT SAR helicopters are alerted by the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC), located at RAF Kinloss in Scotland.

No Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) process is required for the emergency callout of SAR helicopters.

In addition, RAF support helicopters (from RAF Odiham in Hampshire and RAF Benson in Oxfordshire) could be used for the evacuation of larger numbers of serious casualties. The use of support helicopters would be subject to MACA procedures and would depend on the availability of these helicopters.

**Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)**

Where an incident occurs which involves a very high number of casualties it may be necessary for some of them to be taken to a hospital some distance from the scene. In such cases the ambulance control will liaise with HEMS and, in certain circumstances, the military.

HEMS may also be mobilised to any casualty requiring advanced trauma life support from the on-board doctor and paramedic(s).

HEMS is available to land at a predetermined location and provide at least one doctor and trained paramedic to the scene. The helicopter can also be used to ferry additional doctors and resources as well as evacuate single casualties.

The emergency services will consult prior to HEMS deployment.

**HM Coastguard search and rescue helicopters**

HM Coastguard SAR helicopters may also be called upon to assist in marine or land rescue incidents in the London area. Coastguard helicopters are equipped to winch people from the water or from vessels and can carry seated and stretcher casualties. They are fitted with infrared equipment to assist location of casualties in the water in poor visibility and at night.

HM Coastguard helicopters are alerted through LCG for marine incidents and by the MPS through the ARCC at RAF Kinloss for land incidents.

**Temporary heli-pads**

Temporary heli-pads might need to be identified with consideration for:

- safety of crew and aircraft from obstructions such as wires, unit masts and unsuitable terrain;
- safety from harmful chemical release, fire/smoke;
- access to vehicle; and
- disturbance of debris/evidence or disruption by excessive noise.
10.6 Emergency flying restrictions

10.6.1 Police have the facility, through the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to request the imposition of temporary emergency flying restrictions over the scene of an incident under certain circumstances. The most likely reason would be the safety of those in the air or on the ground. Requests for temporary emergency flying restrictions should be made through the Police Silver, who will review the necessity for such restrictions at regular intervals.
11. Investigation

11.1 Evidence

11.1.1 Most major incidents will be the subject of an investigation/inquiry, whether for HM Coroner, a public inquiry, or civil or criminal court proceedings, therefore evidence collected should be of the best possible quality.

11.1.2 In order to gather such evidence the scene must be secured as soon as possible and anything which can be reasonably anticipated to be required as evidence should be preserved and not damaged, moved or disposed of without reference to the leading investigator.

11.1.3 Depending upon the nature of the incident several different agencies may carry out independent investigation. Protocols and a framework for effective liaison have been agreed with the following bodies:

- Air Accident Investigation Branch;
- Marine Accident Investigation Branch;
- Rail Accident Investigation Branch; and
- Health and Safety Executive.

NB: They require the early notification of an incident in order to co-ordinate its response. The list of agencies is not exhaustive and the type of incident will dictate those agencies that may well have an investigation input.

11.1.4 Aerial photography, both video and stills, can help throughout the incident in recording the scene for evidential purposes, as will any other photographic evidence available.

11.2 Police responsibilities

11.2.1 In all suspected terrorist-related incidents The MPS Counter Terrorism Command SO15 will lead.

11.2.2 British Transport Police (BTP) will lead in railway incidents other than those relating to murder or terrorism. Where the incident is of such a scale or there are special reasons, a joint team of BTP and local police may be formed, following discussions between senior officers of both services.
12. Safety

12.1 Health and safety

12.1.1 An appropriate health and safety management structure will be enforced. The responsibility for health and safety of staff at a major incident rests with each agency. The London Fire Brigade (LFB) is responsible for safety management within the inner cordon and advice given must be acted on by all emergency services.

12.1.2 Responding agencies may wish to have a health and safety professional on the scene as soon as possible to advise their respective Silvers and carry out on-site risk assessments and identify control measures and safe systems of work.

12.2 Factories and other industrial sites

12.2.1 These locations have a range of potential hazards including substances that are flammable, reactive, explosive or toxic. Sometimes the hazards are multiple (for example flammable and toxic) and may involve corrosive or radioactive materials. For some sites there are specific emergency plans made under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 1999.

12.2.2 In the context of COMAH incidents, the term ‘major accident’ is used by those agencies involved and should not be confused with the term ‘major incident’. A major accident necessarily entails the invoking of the COMAH plan. ‘Major accident’ means an occurrence (including in particular, a major emission, fire or explosion) resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances.

12.2.3 Enforcing authorities, including the Health and Safety Executive, will need access to such locations following major accidents and may need to gather evidence.

12.3 Fire Brigade ‘HAZMAT’ officers

12.3.1 Certain fire officers who have completed the Hazardous Material and Environmental Protection Course at the Fire Service College will be nominated as hazardous materials ‘HAZMAT’ officers.

12.3.2 ‘HAZMAT’ officers are now mobilised to all confirmed chemical incidents. They will liaise with the London Fire Brigade (LFB) scientific advisor. At radiation incidents HAZMAT officers will carry out the role of radiation protection supervisors and the LFB scientific advisor will carry out the role of radiation protection advisor in accordance with the Ionising Radiation Regulations 1985.

12.4 Rail incidents – safe systems of work

12.4.1 The safety of personnel is paramount when working on or near the track.

12.4.2 With rail accidents the rail infrastructure controller has a key responsibility in terms of site safety. They should interact with the emergency services.
12.4.3 Personnel must always wear high-visibility clothing when working on or near the track. The number of personnel working at the scene should be kept to a minimum.

12.4.4 There are many potential dangers when working in a rail environment. Emergency service personnel should not go on or near the line except in an emergency. Services should follow existing agreements with railway operators.

12.4.5 A request for ‘power off’ should also include ‘trains stopped’ and state the area that this is requested for. ‘Power off’ averts the danger of electrocution, but it must be realised that merely having the power switched off may not have the effect of stopping trains:

- as soon as the power is turned off trains operated by electricity will coast to the nearest station, should the signalling allow; and
- diesel-powered trains, for example, are not dependent on electric power and often run on the same track as electrified trains.

12.4.6 A request for trains stopped and/or power off should be passed through the appropriate rail infrastructure control via the emergency services’ control rooms or the rail incident officer (RIO) on site. This same control will confirm that the request has been carried out.

12.4.7 There is a need to be clear which rail organisation controls the track involved. Network Rail controls the largest amount of railway, so on Network Rail-controlled infrastructure Network Rail will be the lead authority for the rail industry at rail incidents and will protect the scene in consultation with the emergency services. The rail representative on site is the RIO.

12.4.8 Generally, one, or all, of the following three levels of control can be introduced as protection for the site:

- level I – slowing trains by running them at caution;
- level II – stopping trains by use of signals; and
- level III – switching off electricity supply.

12.4.9 Within London there are several railway operating systems:

- Network Rail / train operating companies; (including the Channel Tunnel Rail Link)
- London Underground;
- Docklands Light Railway; and
- other systems, e.g. Croydon Tramlink.

It is therefore essential that those attending incidents are aware which of the systems they are attending.

12.4.10 It is obviously dangerous to go into the vicinity of the railway because of the railway equipment, electrified lines, overhead power and the movement of trains.
12.4.11 Automatic train operation may be operating, as in the case of Docklands Light Railway in the area of the incident; therefore it is essential that the relevant service procedures are complied with.

12.5 **Railway industry**

12.5.1 To ensure an effective response to an incident on the rail network the industry can provide input on:

- safety of personnel;
- general site safety;
- specialist information on rolling stock and infrastructure (tunnels, services, etc.);
- specialist input to investigation; and
- recovery equipment either owned or under contract.
13. Local authority assistance

13.1 Role

13.1.1 Local authorities have a statutory duty to have arrangements in place to respond effectively to an emergency. This will include:

- providing support for the emergency services;
- providing support and care for the local and wider community;
- using resources to mitigate the effects of an emergency; and
- leading the recovery stage.

13.1.2 During a major incident local authorities will maintain their normal day-to-day services to the local community.

13.1.3 All local authorities employ emergency planning officers who are able to plan for and co-ordinate the local authority response to such events.

13.2 Notification and immediate response

13.2.1 Local authorities have pre-identified 24-hour contact numbers to initiate responses. Local authorities take time to mobilise and therefore early notification is required. Constant liaison with local authorities will be necessary as the incident progresses.

13.2.2 Local authorities will provide the personnel to operate Gold, Silver and Bronze command levels as necessary and their response will normally include the establishment of a Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC), from which the local authority response will be co-ordinated.

13.3 Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO)

13.3.1 The LALO is the representative of the affected borough, is able to react to requests for local authority assistance and is the on-scene Silver liaison point to the local authority emergency control centre.

13.3.2 The LALO is:

- required to attend Silver meetings or the JESCC if established, to represent the local authority;
- the link between the incident and the BECC; and
- in possession of effective communications with senior levels of the local authority.

13.4 Functions

13.4.1 It is in the later stages of a major incident (the recovery period and return to normality) that the local authority’s involvement may be prolonged and extensive. The services and staff the local authority may be able to provide are based upon a wide range of skills and resources drawn from its day-to-day operations such as:
Professional

- technical and engineering advice;
- building control;
- highways services; and
- public health and environmental issues.

Physical resources

- provision of reception centres;
- rehousing and accommodation needs; and
- transport.

Caring

- social services;
- psychosocial support;
- helplines; and
- welfare and financial needs.

13.5 Recovery

13.5.1 As the incident progresses towards the recovery phase, the emergency services will need to consider a formal handover to the local authority in order to facilitate the authority’s leading role in the return to normality, the rehabilitation of the community and restoration of the environment in accordance with non-statutory guidance to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Emergency Response and Recovery).
14. Other assistance

14.1 Voluntary aid societies (VAS)

14.1.1 There are numerous VAS which can contribute towards the successful outcome of an incident. Their support at an event can often alleviate some pressure on the statutory bodies by providing humanitarian services. This is especially so during the consolidation and recovery phases when fire, police and ambulance personnel are fully deployed elsewhere.

14.1.2 Listed below are some of the more regularly used societies under the emergency service that initiates them.

**London Fire Brigade**
- Salvation Army.

**London Ambulance Service**
- British Association of Immediate Care (BASICS);
- British Red Cross Society;
- St John Ambulance; and
- Salvation Army.

**Police**
- Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS); and
- First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY).

On arrival the VAS should report to the Scene Access Control prior to going to the rendezvous point.

14.2 Major Incident Multi-faith Plan

14.2.1 The Major Incident Multi-faith Plan has been drawn up in consultation with the London Emergency Services to enable clergy and representatives of London communities to make a quick and effective response in any major incident. This plan must be regarded as a flexible blueprint and be adapted to the demands of each incident. The plan allows for faith communities to minister and care for those injured at the scene of the incident and to offer care and comfort to friends, family and others caught up in the disaster.

14.3 Utility companies

14.3.1 The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be co-ordinated by police in the first instance.

14.3.2 They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.
15. **Media liaison**

15.1 **Introduction**

15.1.1 A major incident involving the joint work of the emergency services in the capital will inevitably attract significant and sustained interest from both national and international media.

15.1.2 It is important that in dealing with the demands of the media, press officers from the emergency services liaise and consult effectively with each other whilst respecting the differing roles of their individual services.

15.1.3 The media can be a useful mechanism to communicate essential advice to the public about how the incident could affect them and what actions they can take.

15.2 **Holding statements**

15.2.1 Once a major incident has been declared all the emergency services involved will be under pressure to provide an immediate statement. At the earliest opportunity a holding statement will be agreed and disseminated by the police press officer.

15.2.2 Police press staff will then contact their counterparts in the other emergency services’ press offices to make them aware of the statement and in turn be informed of the information press officers/staff are releasing to the media. Care should be taken that the statements are not contradictory and do not impinge upon or undermine the actions of the other services.

15.2.3 No information should be provided to the news media in relation to a terrorist incident without authority of the Counter Terrorism Command.

15.3 **Liaison on scene**

15.3.1 Press officers attending the scene of the incident should seek out their counterparts at the earliest opportunity and establish regular liaison so that contentious or conflicting information can be clarified before release to the media. This information should then be passed to their individual press offices.

15.4 **Other agencies**

15.4.1 If the local authority is involved in dealing with the incident and sends a press officer to the scene, he or she should be incorporated into the press officer liaison process. Alternatively press officers from local authorities can liaise by telephone to be informed of any media statements, which have a direct bearing on their organisation. Similarly, and depending on the nature of the major incident, police press officers will consult with their counterparts at other agencies.

15.5 **Gold and Silver co-ordinating group meetings**

15.5.1 Ideally, a police press officer will attend both Gold and Silver co-ordinating group meetings. Likewise, it may also be necessary for senior public affairs or media and communications personnel from the other emergency services to attend the Gold group meetings. It is likely that London Ambulance Service (LAS) and London Fire Brigade (LFB) press officers will also attend the Silver co-ordinating group meetings.
5.5.2 The police press officer – in consultation with Police Gold or Silver – will take the lead on the content of subsequent media statements about the incident as a whole. However, it is important that each emergency service has the opportunity to ensure that the media are aware of their front-line staff’s activities.

**15.6 Casualty figures**

15.6.1 Confirmed casualty figures may be released only after consultation with Police Gold via his or her press officer or the press bureau. It is important that only one set of casualty figures should be released at one time. If the number of casualties involved in an incident rises over a period of time then all the services’ press officers should refrain from giving updated figures until they have been cleared by Police Gold.

15.6.2 LAS press officers may confirm the general nature of types of injuries – unless police specifically request them not to – and the hospitals to which they are taken, but the numbers of fatalities and those seriously injured should only be given when cleared by Police Gold.

15.6.3 There may be circumstances when police specifically request LAS not to release the name and location of the hospital(s) to which casualties have been taken. Although unusual, this could arise in relation to alleged criminals/suspects and potential witnesses.

**15.7 Joint press office**

15.7.1 If the incident is of a sufficiently serious nature, i.e. involving a high number of casualties and/or continuing rescue operations and it is likely to run beyond 12 hours, then consideration will be given to setting up a joint press office.

**15.8 Joint press briefings**

15.8.1 If the emergency services consider it beneficial to hold a joint press briefing the senior police press officer at the scene will liaise with the relevant Silvers and their press officers to agree a suitable format and identify any contentious issues and how they can be dealt with.

15.8.2 The following division of areas of responsibility is suggested for the briefing.

15.8.3 Police* – Overall response to the incident; the number of casualties; how the emergency services coped/are coping; casualty bureau telephone number (if issued); any criminal investigations (except incidents on the railway); local disruption (past and continuing); praise for local people who may have assisted in rescue operations; heroic actions by police officers.

*The City of London Police has mechanisms in place with the MPS, in the event of either a cross-border incident or where assistance is requested from either police service, in relation to staffing casualty bureau or providing operational help. In the event of a major incident there would be full co-operation and assistance to and from the City of London Police.
15.8.4 LFB – The rescue operation; how many people were trapped and in what circumstances; the level in terms of appliances and personnel; what equipment was needed to free people and (where relevant) specific information related to flooding, fires or chemical incidents; heroic actions by fire officers.

15.8.5 LAS – The level and seriousness of injuries; where casualties were taken; how many ambulances and medical staff were involved; whether HEMS (air ambulance) was used; heroic actions by ambulance personnel.

15.8.6 British Transport Police (BTP) (incidents on railway only) – Details of any criminal investigation; disruption to the railway; details about potential public inquiries; heroic actions by BTP and railway staff.

15.9 Media centres

15.9.1 If the incident is on a large scale and is likely to attract a significant media presence for days or even weeks, press officers should consider whether it would be beneficial to establish a media centre near the scene.

15.9.2 Such a centre gives journalists a base to operate from, shelter from the elements and (ideally) provides toilet and refreshment facilities. The advantages to the emergency services include improved communications and speedy organisation of briefings and interviews.

15.9.3 Local authorities keep lists of available buildings in their areas and will assist in identifying a suitable venue such as a school or church hall, preferably with a large exterior area where heavy equipment such as outside broadcasting units can be parked.

15.10 Press debrief

15.10.1 Heads of the emergency services’ media departments will decide if the incident warrants a post-incident debrief with the relevant press officers who were involved. If such a debrief is held, representatives from the various press offices should consider producing a briefing note for their colleagues, evaluating media coverage and identifying best practice and any lessons that have been learned which could assist press officers attending similar incidents in the future.
16. Occupiers’ response to an incident

16.1 It is to be expected that any occupier of premises within a cordoned area, be they residential or business occupiers, would want to gain access to their premises as soon as possible. It should be noted that the term ‘premises’ could be extended to include extensive sites and industrial areas where a major incident may have occurred and affected daily business, e.g. rail networks, chemical sites, airports.

16.1.2 Responding agencies will wish to restore as much normality as possible as quickly as they can.

16.1.3 The area around a major incident is a potential crime scene and the police and other investigators need to carry out a painstaking enquiry to gain material evidence. This could take some time and, during that period, people will be excluded from the area so that vital evidence is not lost.

16.1.4 Damage caused by the incident may make the area unsafe to enter. The local authority would exercise its powers under the Building Act to remove those imminent dangers that represent a major safety hazard. It may be considered unsafe to allow owners to move in and attempt to deal with their properties simultaneously. In such cases, in the interest of public safety, the local authority may engage approved contractors to board up and commence repair work.

16.2 The inner cordon

16.2.1 An inner cordon may well be in place for a prolonged period. However, the boundaries could be redrawn once the search for evidence has been completed, but the immediate area may be out of bounds for days or, in some instances, weeks.

16.2.2 The London Fire Brigade (LFB) is responsible for safety within the inner cordon. Subject to LFB and all relevant safety advice, police may allow a limited number of people to enter their premises to undertake damage assessment or retrieval of some items for a few minutes or hours.

16.3 The outer cordon

16.3.1 The police will aim to keep drawing in the outer cordon so that, at any time, only areas that have yet to be cleared for safety are within it. As premises are progressively freed from the cordon, occupiers will need to be on hand to secure their premises as soon as they are released.

16.3.2 The police, assisted by the local authority, will ensure that occupiers likely to be affected are given sufficient advance notice of the movement of the cordon boundaries.

16.3.3 During a prolonged incident the redefining of cordon areas will be continually reassessed.
17. **Debriefing**

17.3.1 At some stage, when the incident has ended, each of the services and agencies involved in the incident will hold a series of operational debriefs. Initially these will be confined to each particular service, but later a multi-agency debrief will be held and lessons learned will be incorporated into this Manual and other service manuals, as appropriate.

17.3.2 Multi-agency debriefs should consider the contribution provided by other, non-emergency service agencies to expand the knowledge and learning process that debriefs should collate. This is notwithstanding the potential conflict of interest that may result in later investigations. This aspect should be considered when inviting agencies other than emergency services to the debrief.

17.3.3 Operational debriefs should not be confused with diffusing welfare sessions for staff, which should form part of the trauma support programmes arranged by individual organisations.

17.3.4 The thrust of any such debriefs would be to identify areas for improvement in procedures, equipment and systems. They should not be forums for criticising the performance of others.

17.3.5 Debriefs should not interfere with or comment on investigations into the incident carried out by investigative or judicial authorities.

17.3.6 It is important to realise that such debriefs and related documents would be disclosable to individuals involved in legal proceedings.
18. Welfare of responders

18.1.1 Recent incidents have shown that welfare and trauma support should be made available to staff of organisations deployed in major incident scenarios. This support should be available from the very outset and early stages of the incident where required, and if requested by individual organisations. The responsibility for identifying the need for welfare support rests jointly with the individuals, their managers and the department within each organisation with responsibility for staff welfare.

18.1.2 Those who are particularly traumatised will require skilled professional help and this is now provided by all the services involved. Arrangements for this must be made in a way that ensures confidentiality and overcomes the cultural resistance in the emergency services to such a step. These facilities should also be made available to support staff, even if they are not directly involved at the scene, e.g. administration staff, drivers and communications staff.
Appendix A: Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices

A.1 Introduction

A.1.1 In recent years there has been an increased awareness of the threat posed by a CBRN terrorist attack. It is anticipated that the terrorist may use a device to release hazardous materials. The threat from such a device is significant, not only as a result of its activation but also in the fear and panic that it would create within society.

A.1.2 The following are brief descriptions of CBRN devices:

C – Chemical. These devices will contain some form of chemical agent, the effects of which range from causing watery eyes, blistering to the skin through, in the worst-case scenario, to instantaneous death. Examples are CS, Sarin and Mustard Gas.

B – Biological. These devices contain some form of biological agent. The effects of this type of device are not immediately apparent as the biological agent may take a number of days or even weeks to incubate in an infected victim. However, the result of exposure and subsequent infection can range from flu-like symptoms through, in extreme cases, to death. Examples are anthrax, cholera and ebola.

R – Radiological. These devices may contain a quantity of radioactive material as a part of a conventional explosive device. On detonation the radioactive material is spread over large distances, making the area unsafe to humans until it has been cleared up. Exposed individuals are likely to be externally and internally contaminated with radioactive material. Depending on the received dose there may be short-term (e.g. radiation sickness) and long-term (e.g. cancer) effects from such an exposure.

N – Nuclear. These devices take considerable scientific expertise to create and the most likely source of such a device is the existing nuclear stockpile across the world.

A.1.3 The presence of a radiological or nuclear device can easily be detected by equipment that measures radiation levels, even before the device has detonated. Survey meters and electronic personal dose meters are examples of such equipment.

A.1.4 The presence of chemical or biological agents is harder to detect prior to release. However, once activated, the effects of a chemical device are likely to create an immediate reaction from the victims. In the case of a biological device the effects will not be immediately visible after activation.

A.1.5 An LESLP response in line with the procedure laid out in this Manual will be required for both pre- and post-activation of a suspected CBRN device. All three emergency services have personnel who have been trained and equipped to deal with the specialist response that is required for such an incident.

A.1.6 The main functions of the emergency services and other agencies at a CBRN incident are the same as those laid out in Section 3 of this Manual. However, both the London Ambulance Service (LAS) and London Fire Brigade (LFB) have additional responsibilities specific to the decontamination process.
A.1.7 Definition of decontamination

Decontamination is the procedure employed to remove hazardous materials from people and equipment.

Clinical decontamination is the medical procedure to treat patients affected by or contaminated with hazardous materials. The prioritisation of casualties prior to decontamination requires the input of specialist National Health Service (NHS) staff.

Emergency decontamination is a procedure carried out when time does not allow for the deployment of specialist NHS resources and it is judged as imperative that decontamination of people is carried out as soon as possible. Improvised equipment may be used in lieu of dedicated facilities where it is imperative to remove hazardous material as soon as possible. It is recognised by all agencies that the implementation of emergency decontamination may carry risks to certain groups, for example, the elderly, the infirm and the injured. Irrespective of which agency commences decontamination, the process should fall under the clinical control of the NHS as soon as practicable to ensure the safe management of casualties.

Mass decontamination is the procedure to decontaminate people when the NHS, or the LAS on its behalf, has identified to the LFB that the number requiring decontamination has overwhelmed, or threatens to overwhelm, the Health Service’s capacity. It may be for the LFB to initiate mass decontamination procedures prior to the arrival of the NHS or in circumstances where specialist NHS resources are not immediately available. This may be carried out by improvising with available equipment and facilities until dedicated supporting facilities can be resourced. It will be important to establish basic triage arrangements, involving both LAS and LFB personnel, as soon as possible.
Appendix B:
Incidents on railways
(police inter-service co-operation)

B.1 Introduction

B.1.1 The following section outlines an agreement that has been reached nationally between British Transport Police (BTP) and all Home Office forces. It repeats principles of responsibility which have worked well in the past, but which should be considered flexible as circumstances demand.

B.1.2 All officers arriving at the scene will report to the senior officer present. That officer, whether from BTP, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) or City of London Police (COLP) will perform the function of Police Silver. Where the first supervisor to arrive is from the MPS or COLP, it is recommended that the first BTP officer to arrive be appointed as liaison officer, where their specialist knowledge will prove useful.

B.1.3 It is essential that the police response by the local force and BTP is co-ordinated so that there are no wasted resources or duplication of roles.

B.1.4 The first officer of Inspector rank or above from either force will assume the role of Silver, taking responsibility for the initial co-ordination and deployment of resources from each force.

B.1.5 On the arrival of their counterpart from the other force they will work together forming a team that ensures the resources, equipment and communications of both forces are used in the most effective way.

B.1.6 In broad terms, the responsibility of each force is:

- BTP on-site,
- MPS or
- COLP off-site.

The specific responsibilities below are suggested as a guide and it is emphasised that just as each incident and the resources available will be different in each case so flexibility, discussion and mutual co-operation are essential to ensure the co-ordinated response discussed earlier.

B.1.7 The LFB has access to Channel 5 communications on all sub-surface railway networks, which can be made available for use by other emergency services.
### Police responsibilities: Incidents on railways

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Incident Commander (Gold)</td>
<td>Home Office force with BTP senior officer working in conjunction advising on BTP/railway matters and present at co-ordinating group meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>Except in the case of terrorism or murder, BTP will be responsible for investigating the incident. Where an incident is of such magnitude or there are special reasons whereby a joint team should be formed, this will be done after discussions between senior officers of both forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner cordon and matters on railway property</td>
<td>BTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer cordon</td>
<td>MPS/COLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of bodies</td>
<td>The removal of all bodies from the scene must be co-ordinated by MPS or COLP, whichever service effects the removal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortuary</td>
<td>MPS/COLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty bureau and identification</td>
<td>MPS/COLP – BTP liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property of deceased</td>
<td>MPS/COLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property from scene</td>
<td>BTP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press/media</td>
<td>Joint response through co-ordinating group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic (road)</td>
<td>MPS/COLP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital documentation</td>
<td>MPS/COLP with BTP assistance if necessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Aircraft incidents

C.1 Introduction
C.1.1 A major air incident is by its very nature an extremely sudden and catastrophic event, placing all the organisations concerned with the response under intense pressure. The scale of such events means their effects often cross administrative boundaries and involve a massive and lengthy recovery operation.

C.1.2 Major incidents involving aircraft that occur within airfield boundaries will involve a local response based upon Civil Aviation Authority directions.

C.2 Specific site hazards
C.2.1 A major air accident will produce a toxic environment at the scene and all services responding should be aware of the need for extra attention to the identification of potential hazards and the protection of their staff. A crashed aircraft should be approached from an upwind direction whether there is a fire or not, due to the potential spread of toxic substances.

C.2.2 In addition to the London Fire Brigade, both the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) and RAF/RN are able to advise on potential hazards from crashed aircraft and the materials present in specific aircraft types. The RAF Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Flight (ARTF) at RAF St Athan, Wales, can provide the relevant information for military fixed wing aircraft, while the RN Mobile Aircraft Support Unit at RNAY Fleetlands, Gosport, can provide similar information for military helicopters. This information can also be obtained via the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre at RAF Kinloss. They can fax hazard information to any emergency service on request.

C.3 Organisations involved

Air Accidents Investigation Branch
C.3.1 The AAIB investigates all civil aircraft accidents that occur in the UK and helps in the investigation of military accidents at the request of the Ministry of Defence. There are a number of statutory powers associated with this role through the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations 1989. These regulations gave the AAIB powers of investigation relating to the management of the scene. Close liaison between the AAIB investigators and the emergency services at the scene is essential at the earliest possible opportunity.

C.3.2 The police will be responsible for contacting the AAIB on being informed of an incident. The initial AAIB response to a major air accident will consist of a small team of pilots and engineers who will work with RAF pathologists, where necessary. The police investigation will be carried out in close co-operation with the AAIB.

British Airways’ Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC)
C.3.3 EPIC acts as a central airline information co-ordinating point. It collates information from airline services worldwide, including details of all passengers, crew and baggage. Most airlines operating through the UK subscribe to EPIC, which is situated at Heathrow.
C.3.4 EPIC acts as an information centre following an incident and handles a large number of telephone calls that might otherwise be directed to the Police Casualty Bureau. EPIC documentation is identical to the National Casualty Bureau paperwork to ease enquiries.

Royal Air Force

C.3.5 The RAF will deal with post-crash recovery for all military fixed-wing aircraft accidents and has the capability to help with civilian incidents, where requested, particularly with wreckage removal in line with AAIB guidance. The unit involved is the ARTF, based at RAF St Athan in Wales. RAF search and rescue (SAR) resources may be alerted by calling the Air Rescue Co-ordination Centre (Kinloss) duty officer.

Royal Navy

C.3.6 The RN will deal with all military rotary-wing aircraft crashes. The unit is the Mobile Aircraft Support Unit based at RNAY Fleetlands, Gosport, Hants.

C.4 Aircraft incident categories

C.4.1 In order for the emergency services and aerodrome authorities to understand the nature of an emergency, they have defined the following categories for use during a prescribed incident. Slight local variations between aerodromes may exist, though the broad outline of the definition remains the same. Air Traffic Control (ATC) will usually make the initial decision on the category of emergency. Subject to threat assessment by the police and aerodrome authority there may be occasions when a response to a bomb warning is required to an aircraft either in the air, on the ground or on the aerodrome premises.

Full emergency

C.4.2 When ATC knows or suspects that an aircraft in flight is in difficulty which, if aggravated, could result in an accident.

Aircraft ground incident

C.4.3 When ATC becomes aware or suspects that an aircraft on the ground is involved in an incident of a lesser nature than an aircraft accident. The incident may have caused aircraft damage, or have the potential to result in aircraft damage or put the passengers and crew at risk.

Aircraft accident imminent

C.4.4 When ATC considers an aircraft accident is inevitable, either on or in the vicinity of the airport.

Aircraft accident

C.4.5 When ATC becomes aware that an aircraft accident has occurred on the airport or within the airport boundary.
Appendix C: Aircraft incidents

**Aircraft accident off-airport**

C.4.6 When ATC becomes aware that an aircraft accident has occurred beyond the airfield boundary.

**Full emergency hijack**

C.4.7 Where ATC becomes aware that a person on an aircraft, by the use of force or threat of any kind, intends to seize the aircraft or exercises control of it.

**Act of aggression**

C.4.8 An act of terrorism, armed attack, bomb attack, hostage situation (other than hijack on an aircraft) or other similar acts of terrorism is taking or has taken place on or adjacent to the aerodrome boundary.
Appendix D: River Thames incident

D.1 Introduction

D.1.1 There are several unique features relating to the management of an incident on the river Thames, therefore special procedures apply to major incidents on the tidal river Thames, its creeks and tributaries.

D.1.2 The Port of London Authority (PLA) is the statutory harbour authority for the tidal Thames and is responsible for, inter-alia, facilitating navigational safety through the regulation of marine operations and the provision of navigational information and advice.

D.1.3 There are sixteen riparian London boroughs plus the City of London Corporation (details of local authority assistance are contained within Section 3).

D.1.4 A centre line along the river Thames acts as an administrative boundary between adjacent boroughs on the north and south banks. Any incident occurring on the river is therefore likely to affect two or more London boroughs and/or the City of London.

D.2 Main functions of the emergency services and other agencies

D.2.1 HM Coastguard

D.2.1.1 London Coastguard (LCG) will be responsible for the co-ordination of Search and Rescue (SAR) on the river Thames between Teddington and Canvey Island. This includes the activation and deployment of civil SAR response to vessels or persons in need of assistance.

D.2.1.2 Throughout the initial phase of an incident HM Coastguard will make tactical decisions in relation to SAR.

D.2.1.3 This will include identifying which Casualty Landing Points (CLP) are most appropriate. They will be responsible for communicating CLP locations to other agencies.

D.2.2 Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI)

D.2.2.1 The RNLI’s primary area of responsibility is the rescue of persons in distress. They have permanently staffed stations on the river Thames, at Gravesend, Waterloo Pier and Chiswick, each having one fully crewed lifeboat on stand-by 24 hours a day. In addition a fourth station at Teddington is crewed by volunteers who are available 24 hours a day. They are co-ordinated by LCG.

D.2.3 Metropolitan Police – Marine Support Unit (MSU)

D.2.3.1 MSU operates a 24-hour response from its base at Wapping, although it can be assigned direct from Information Room (IR) in the event of a river incident. In a SAR situation it and other rescue craft are co-ordinated by LCG.

D.2.3.2 The MSU will, during the early stages of any incident, also be responsible for liaison between LCG and the MPS Special Operations Room (SOR/GT).

D.2.3.3 Land-based police: see 3.2.
### Appendix D: River Thames incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D.2.4</th>
<th>London Fire Brigade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.2.4.1</td>
<td>The LFB has two rapid response vessels, which operate 24 hours. During a SAR incident they are co-ordinated by LCG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.2.4.2</td>
<td>Land-based fire response: see 3.3.</td>
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<tr>
<th>D.2.5</th>
<th>London Ambulance Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.2.5.1</td>
<td>Land-based London Ambulance Service: see 3.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.2.5.2</td>
<td>In addition a representative from the LAS will liaise with police in relation to issues connected with CLPs and casualty clearance.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D.2.6</th>
<th>Port of London Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.2.6.1</td>
<td>PLA Harbour Service craft operate on the tidal river Thames from the lower reaches in Kent and Essex to Teddington and have a 24-hour capability below Putney. Salvage, diving and hydrographic resources are based at Gravesend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.2.6.2</td>
<td>The Harbour Master has extensive statutory powers to regulate river traffic and the use of the river by the public in an emergency situation, and will be responsible for the co-ordination of all non-SAR incidents within Port Limits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.2.6.3</td>
<td>London Vessel Traffic Service (London VTS), operated by the PLA, will maintain the safety of navigation outside and around the area of a major incident, if necessary implementing a river closure or an exclusion zone. London VTS provides facilities for LCG at Woolwich.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>D.2.7</th>
<th>Environment Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.2.7.1</td>
<td>Upstream of Teddington Lock the river is non-tidal and the Environment Agency is the navigation authority. This appendix only details SOPs for the tidal river Thames, downstream of Teddington.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>D.2.8</th>
<th>Assistance of other vessels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.2.8.1</td>
<td>There is a statutory duty on the master of a vessel to go to the assistance of another vessel or person in distress. Public involvement may thus play a greater role than would otherwise be expected in a land-based incident. LCG would co-ordinate any such assistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>D.3</th>
<th>Scene management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.3.1</td>
<td>Cordons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.3.1.1</td>
<td>PLA, in consultation with the MSU and LCG, will implement a river closure or exclusion zone and maintain safety of navigation around the incident. MSU (Bronze River) will be responsible for policing the incident/crime scene after life-saving issues are completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.3.1.2</td>
<td>Due to the nature of the tide the incident/crime scene may move.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D.3.1.3 Landside cordons will be implemented by police and should reflect any movement of river cordons. They will be under the control of the respective land-based sector Bronze.

D.3.2 Rendezvous points (RVP)
D.3.2.1 RVPs in relation to incidents on the river will be designated by police once the location of CLPs are established.

D.3.2.2 Consideration should be given to utilising one RVP on each bank of the river.

D.3.3 Casualty Landing Points
D.3.3.1 Access to the river Thames is limited, particularly at low tide, and consequently CLPs have been identified. These points are listed and copies supplied to all emergency services, river agencies and riparian boroughs. They have been selected so that any casualty, no matter how serious his/her injury, can be landed at any state of the tide. CLPs are accessible by road and are generally piers.

D.3.3.2 When a SAR incident occurs on the river, LCG will identify the location and designate suitable CLPs, consulting if necessary with the other emergency services and the PLA. The CLPs must be protected by land-based police resources.

D.3.3.3 An ambulance officer will attend a CLP in order to keep ambulance control up-to-date with the number and condition of casualties.

D.3.3.4 Consideration may be given to utilising CLPs on both sides of the river.

D.3.4 Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC)
D.3.4.1 Due to tidal effects the incident scene may move. It may be necessary in a protracted incident to alter cordons and access points as time passes. Therefore the positioning of JESCC must be selected with care, as it will not be practical to move it once set up.

D.3.4.2 The officer of each service nominated to perform the function of Silver will normally operate from the land-based JESCC, although it may be considered useful for them to board one of the vessels to obtain a first-hand view of the scene. The co-ordinating group visiting the scene collectively may best achieve this.

D.3.4.3 Due to the above-mentioned difficulties, consideration should be given to establishing the JESCC at the MPS SOR (currently referred to as GT), or at London VTS Emergency Response Centre.

D.3.4.4 In the event of a major incident on the river, the PLA and HM Coastguard would each send a liaison officer to the JESCC.
Appendix D: River Thames incident

D.3.5 ‘On-scene’ co-ordinator

D.3.5.1 One vessel, as well as assisting with the incident, would normally undertake the function of ‘on-scene co-ordinator’, reporting back to LCG for SAR co-ordination. Each vessel will maintain contact with LCG on the dedicated Marine SAR channel and with its own service control.

D.3.5.2 The on-scene co-ordinating vessel and the outer river cordon vessel should, ideally, be clearly distinguishable from other vessels by using blue flashing lights; other vessels within the exclusion zone should not use blue lights.

D.3.6 Scene access control

D.3.6.1 River-based units deployed within the exclusion zone will be logged by LCG. Other river traffic will be excluded by both London VTS and vessels enforcing river closures.

D.3.6.2 Land-based police are responsible for maintaining land-based cordons and considering the changing nature of the foreshore due to tidal flow.

D.4.1 Additional command and control issues

D.4.1.1 Bronze will control and deploy the resources of its respective service within a geographical sector or specific role and implement the tactics defined by Silver. Therefore consideration should be given to utilising the Bronze structure mentioned below and where necessary utilising supplementary Bronzes.

D.4.1.2 Bronze River – will be responsible for the deployment of their respective resources within the river sector.

D.4.1.3 Bronze North/South – It is likely that land-based resources will attend the incidents from both sides of the river and therefore each service responding to a river-based incident should consider utilising a Bronze for both north and south banks of the river Thames.

D.5.1 Communications

D.5.1.1 LCG Operations Room is co-located with London VTS at the Thames Barrier Navigation Centre, Woolwich with PLA VTS operations. It should be noted that LCG is a single-person operator station, and in the event of a major incident they will, in the initial stages, concentrate on the tactical deployment of rescue craft. Immediate support via a link is available to LCG from Thames Coastguard at Walton on the Naze.

D.5.1.2 Rescue vessels will be deployed and co-ordinated direct from LCG at London VTS using dedicated Marine Band VHF radio on Channel Zero. This channel is fitted to all declared search and rescue craft including Metropolitan Police Service, MSU and London Fire Brigade (LFB) vessels.
Appendix D: River Thames incident

D.5.1.3 LCG radio contact with land-based police units can be enabled via the METRADIO 'Royal National Lifeboat Institution’ channel, which is linked via Information Room or GT. The link can be opened with any Metropolitan Police Talk Group on request.

D.5.1.4 The PLA communications (London VTS) are Marine VHF radio, and include Channel 14 for navigational purposes, and the international distress frequency Channel 16.

D.5.1.5 London VTS broadcasts navigational information to all river craft, and in the event of a major incident instructions and information would be transmitted by this means.

D.5.1.6 Information Room or GT, London Ambulance Service Control, LFB Control and MSU Wapping all have direct line telephone links with LCG. LCG is equipped with METphone facilities.
E.1 Introduction

E.1.1 The effects of climate change mean that flooding is likely to become an increasingly common event, which could affect both urban and rural parts of London. Flooding may be localised but occur simultaneously across London, amounting to a series of major incidents, which may be short term or protracted. Rivers are classified by the Environment Agency as main rivers and ordinary watercourses. The Environment Agency is responsible for the flood prevention measures on main rivers. Ordinary watercourses are the responsibility of various bodies such as local authorities and other landowners.

E.2 Types of flooding

E.2.1 There are four types of flooding, the responses to which are similar:

- fluvial;
- tidal;
- flash floods; and
- burst water mains.

E.3 Flood warnings

E.3.1 The Environment Agency is only responsible for the issue of flood warnings in respect of main rivers. These warnings are categorised as:

- Flood watch;
- Flood warning;
- Severe flood warning; and
- All clear.

E.3.2 These warnings are sent by fax to the emergency services, local authorities and other professional partners. The definitions and actions required upon receipt of such warnings are to be found in the Local Flood Warning plan and the strategy document. Warnings are also sent by various means to people in the likely affected area. Further information can be obtained on Flood Line 0845 988 1188.

E.3.3 The Met Office issues warnings of severe weather, which give warning of the possibility of flooding from other sources.
E.4 Roles and responsibilities

E.4.1 The following are in addition to the roles and responsibilities mentioned throughout this Manual.

Police

In the event of the agreed procedures for warning and informing communities at risk not being effective, then, where practicable, assistance will be given.

Fire Brigade

Gives assistance with pumping operations, depending on the situation prevailing at the time, priority being given to calls where flooding involves a risk to life, of fire or explosion and to calls from hospitals, residential homes for the elderly, public utilities and food storage depots. To assist other relevant agencies, particularly the local authority, to minimise the effects of major flooding on the community.

Ambulance

The London Ambulance Service (LAS) may become involved in the evacuation of vulnerable persons and supporting the local authority. It should be noted that the LAS does not possess any waterborne response capability.

Local authority

Provision of general advice and information in support of the Environment Agency to the public on flood prevention measures and environmental health issues.

London Boroughs may also provide further assistance to the public if resources permit, i.e. drying-out facilities, provision, filling or placing of sandbags where danger is foreseen.

Joint agency co-ordination of non-life threatening floods and of the recovery phase following a flooding incident.
E.5 Planning and response issues

E.5.1 In responding to the flooding incidents the following should be considered, particularly in the planning stages:

- risk assessment;
- danger from flowing water (speed, force, currents, undertow) and submerged hazards;
- local authority liaison officers for response and monitoring purposes;
- equipment and training in its use (e.g. access to boats for suitably trained personnel, footwear, buoyancy aids, safety lines, flood-plain maps, local knowledge of flood effects);
- traffic diversion plan with sign locations (see Section 67, Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1984);
- Police Marine Support Unit, Port of London Authority, RNLI;
- military assistance (e.g. sandbagging, specialist vehicles, etc., see Appendix F);
- vulnerable persons (e.g. children, disabled, etc.);
- vulnerable premises (e.g. occupied basements, electrical installations, sub-level car parks, etc.);
- contaminated water (hazard to rescue services as well as the public);
- supplies of drinking water;
- guidance and health advice leaflets, newsletter, helpline, etc.;
- early appointment of a flood recovery group; and
- rest centres – establishment and transport.
Appendix F: Military assistance to a major London incident

F.1 References

- *Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience – IJDP 02.*

F.2 Policy

F.2.1 Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) within the UK is subdivided into:

- *Military Aid to other Government Departments* (MAGD). For example, Fire Strike 2002/3, and Foot and Mouth Disease 2001
- *Military Aid to the Civil Power* (MACP). For example, Deployment of troops to Heathrow 2002 and Northern Ireland 1969-
- *Military Aid to the Civil Community* (MACC). Flooding 2000. For a major immediate impact event, the most likely assistance is unarmed military manpower for general duties tasks.

F.3 Three categories of MACC

F.3.1 Cat A – Emergency Assistance to the Civil Authorities in time of emergency such as natural disasters or major emergencies. This might involve the military contingency plan called Op SEQUESTER to deploy troops at short notice.

F.3.2 Cat B & C – Routine Assistance and Attachment of Volunteers are not applicable in a major incident in London.

F.4 Three principles guiding the provision of MACC:

- Military assistance should always be the last resort. It must have been demonstrated that the use of mutual aid, other organisations and the private sector are impossible or unsuitable.
- The Civil Authorities lack the required level of capability and it is unreasonable to expect them to develop one.
- The Civil Authority has the capability, but the need to act is urgent and there is an immediate lack of Civil Resources available.

F.5 Authority to deploy

F.5.1 Military resources are not specifically set aside for assisting in an emergency, so any assistance will depend on what assets are available at the time. Involvement by the military chain-of-command and Defence Ministerial approval is necessary for assets to be deployed.

F.5.2 Armed Forces support must always be at the specific request of the Civil Authorities and in almost all circumstances requires the specific authorisation of Defence Ministers. In the event of a MACC Cat A event – emergency assistance, the General Officer Commanding
Appendix F: Military assistance to a major London incident

London District has the authority to deploy personnel under his command immediately without reference to higher command if they can be immediately helpful in alleviating distress and saving lives and property.

F.6 Reaction to an ‘immediate impact’ emergency

F.6.1 For an ‘immediate impact’ event, HQ London District will appoint a Joint (tri-Service) Military Liaison Officer (JRLO) who will attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC), if formed, and will provide a single point of contact for Military Aid requests (except Special Forces). All requests should be made through the Chair of the Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) for consideration by HQ London District Operations Centre and the Military chain-of-command.

F.6.2 Some niche capabilities, such as engineers, aviation and bomb disposal, are already used and their tasking and capabilities are well understood by the MPS.

F.7 General capabilities

F.7.1 Able to provide the military command, control and communications based on HQ LONDIST enabling a 24/7 capability, in order to supervise and carry out tasks in support of and in co-ordination with the emergency services and local authorities.

F.7.2 Able to be logistically self-supporting.

F.7.3 Able to be flexible and responsive, but operate only within own capabilities.

F.7.4 Manpower for unarmed general duties might be made through Op SEQUESTER for the crisis and consequence management phases of a major ‘immediate impact’ emergency. These tasks might include:

- Reconnaissance. Deployment of small command teams to assist the emergency services in determining the extent of, and monitoring an incident.
- Public control. Assistance to MPS in controlling access and crowd management, but short of involvement in maintenance of ‘public order’ which remains a police responsibility.
- Evacuation. Assist the police in the control or channelling of large numbers of public in the incident area.
- Route guidance. Identification and securing of safe routes around the incident area.
- Cordons. Provision of manpower for cordons. A police presence would be expected perhaps on a ratio of 1:5 soldiers.
- Access control. Assisting police control at RV/access points. Provide marshals to control or channel large numbers of people in particular at RVs and access points.
- Media handling. Assist in handling the media and other non-governmental agencies.
- Stores protection and Distribution. Assist in protecting and transporting stores and supplies including medicines.
Appendix F: Military assistance to a major London incident

- Key installations. Supporting the police to prevent looting and theft, particularly if key installations are directly affected by the incident.
- Mass casualties. Personnel may be required to give limited emergency first aid, stretcher evacuation, aid to walking wounded, locating, securing and marking bodies or body parts, and support to the medical services to enable access and evacuation.
- Engineering tasks. The civil and local authorities will retain the lead on any civil engineering tasks but may be supported by Royal Engineer assets if available. Troops may be tasked to provide assistance with site search and safety checks, provision of flood or water defences and the use of boats, assistance with the removal of debris from areas where people might be trapped or where key facilities are buried.
- Temporary accommodation. Secure, organise, and control emergency or temporary accommodation.
- Water and feeding points. In addition to integral catering and water, support troops may be asked to man and control feeding points and water points at the site and assist with the supply of food to areas of the incident.
- Rest centres. Assist local authorities in managing premises designated for temporary accommodation for refugees.

F.7.5 Troops will always deploy as a self-contained formed body under command of an Officer or Non-Commissioned-Officer (NCO) throughout the period of military involvement. They will initially report to and work under the direction of the emergency services’ Bronze commander. A Liaison Officer will also deploy as the military point of contact at Gold, Silver and Bronze.

F.7.6 After the immediate response to an incident, it is less likely that the military would be made available during the Consequence and Recovery phase of an emergency. However, the same caveats would apply should the RCCC seek support.

F.8 Reaction to a ‘rising tide’ emergency

F.8.1 This is more likely to be a MAGD engagement. On the outset of a ‘rising tide’ emergency, military advice should be sought from HQ London District at Horse Guards, Whitehall, through the Operations Officer or the JRLOs. While informal discussion and contingency planning may take place at a local level, the Civil Authority must submit a formal request, through the Home Office to the MOD for military aid before the chain-of-command will take action.

F.8.2 Requests for MACA support should be submitted in good time and should articulate clearly not only the effect required, but also why military resources are needed to achieve it.

F.9 Costs

F.9.1 Defence Funds are granted for Defence Purposes. Where work is done by the Armed Forces for other purposes, the MOD is required by ‘Treasury Rules’ to secure reimbursement for the costs incurred. MACA activity is, with few specific exceptions, such as the niche
Appendix F: Military assistance to a major London incident

capabilities mentioned above, not funded within the MOD vote and is conducted on a repayment basis. This is normal practise within Government Departments. There are three charging levels:

F.9.2 ‘No cost’ – costs would be waived where life is at risk or in other exceptional circumstances. The decision would normally be taken centrally but as stated in paragraph F.5.2 Commanders are empowered to respond immediately to save life and waive costs. In a major ‘immediate impact’ situation a ‘no-cost’ basis is likely until the Recovery phase when the military will seek to withdraw or costs may at least start being assessed.

F.9.3 ‘No loss costs’ – Recover the costs that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. This is applied when a task is undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities or another Government department for ‘rising tide’ events such as for Fire Service strike and foot and mouth disease.

F.9.4 ‘Full costs’ – All costs, direct and indirect, incurred improvising assistance, including basic pay, and allowances of personnel.
Appendix G: Glossary

Ambulance loading point  An area, preferably hard-standing, in close proximity to the casualty clearing station, where ambulances can manoeuvre and load patients.

Body collection point  A point close to the scene where the dead can be kept temporarily until transfer to the mortuary. Ideally the premises should be secure, dry, cool and have ample drainage.

Brigade control  The Fire Brigade Command and Mobilising Centre at Greenwich View Place.

Casualty  A person directly involved in or affected by the incident (injured, uninjured, deceased or evacuee).

Casualty bureau  Central contact and information point for all records and data relating to casualties.

Casualty clearing station  An area set up at a major incident by the ambulance service in liaison with the medical incident officer to assess, treat and triage sort casualties and direct their evacuation (see Triage).

CBRN  Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear – material that has potential to be adapted for use in a terrorist incident.

CCC-IR  Central Command Complex – Information Room at New Scotland Yard.

CCC-SOR  Special Operations Room at New Scotland Yard.

Controlled area  The area contained by the outer cordon that may be divided into geographical sectors.

Cordon  The perimeter of an area, for example, the rescue zone or a sector. May be physical or improvised.

Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)  A qualified NHS ambulance person who has obtained the Institute of Health Care Development Certificate in Ambulance Aid Training. They may also be permitted to administer specified drugs.

EOC  LAS Emergency Operations Centre.

EPIC  British Airways' Emergency Procedures Information Centre.

EPM  A trained Emergency Planning Manager who can provide advice and support to the Ambulance Incident Officers and others on matters relating to emergency planning and other ambulance service or NHS requirements.
Appendix G: Glossary

Evacuees’ assembly point  A location of safety, near the scene, where evacuees can be directed initially for assembly before being transported to rest centres.

FBC  The LAS Fallback Control facility at Bow.

Forward control/command point  A control point/forward command post dealing directly with activity at the scene and the respective emergency service resources at the scene.

Friends and relatives reception centre  Secure area set aside for use by friends and relatives arriving and for interviews with them. This will usually be maintained and operated by the police.

Health Advisory Team (HAT)  The HAT is a strategic group chaired by the NHS composed of representatives from a range of organisations and specialities who are able to give co-ordinated authoritative advice on the health aspects of an incident to the police Incident Commander, the NHS and other agencies.

Humanitarian Assistance Centre  A sophisticated facility where bereaved families, survivors and anyone else directly affected by an incident can receive information and appropriate support from all the relevant agencies, without the need for immediate referral elsewhere.

Hospitals, receiving  The hospitals to be alerted by the London Ambulance Service (LAS) to receive casualties in the event of a major incident. The LAS maintains a medical incident officer (MIO) pool and will invariably employ doctors from this group when the need for an MIO and support becomes apparent. Receiving hospitals must be adequately equipped to receive casualties on a 24-hour basis and able to provide, when required, the medical incident officer and a mobile medical/nursing team.

ICP  Incident Control Point.

Joint Emergency Services  The main police, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Control Centre (JESCC) Service Control/Command Units, together with the public utilities and local authority which should be located close to one another and form the focus point from which the incident will be managed.

LALO  Local authority liaison officer.

London Fire Brigade inter-agency liaison officer (ILO)  A trained and qualified officer who can advise and support incident commanders, police, medical, military and other Government agencies on the brigade’s operational capacity and capability, to reduce risk and safely resolve incidents at which a brigade attendance may be
required. This will include major incidents, complex or protracted multi-agency incidents, terrorist-related incidents, public order, domestic or any other situation that would benefit from attendance of the ILO.

LHAC
The London Humanitarian Assistance Centre is a facility where bereaved families, survivors and anyone else directly affected by the incident can receive information and appropriate support from all relevant agencies – without the need for immediate referral elsewhere.

LRT
London Resilience Team.

LUL
London Underground Limited.

MACA
Military Aid to the Civil Authority.

MACC
Military Aid to the Civil Community.

Marshalling area
Area to which resources and personnel from all services can be directed to stand by. Fire Brigade reliefs may be directed there to be briefed before final deployment by Silver Fire.

Marshalling officer
Service representative at marshalling area.

MCA
Maritime and Coastguard Agency.

Media centre
Central contact point for media enquiries, providing communications and conference facilities and staffed by press officers from all organisations.

Officer of the Day (OOD)
A fire brigade divisional officer rostered to perform this duty at the Command Support Centre (CSC) at Brigade Headquarters.

Overall commander (Gold)
Designated principal officer of each service who assumes the co-ordinating function for the operation as a whole on behalf of their service.

Paramedic
A qualified state registered NHS ambulance person who has obtained the Institute of Health Care Development Certificate in Extended Ambulance Aid Training. They may also be permitted to administer specified drugs.

PLA
Port of London Authority.
### Police incident officer (PIO)
Silver or ground commander, responsible for decisions at a tactical level.

### Police media representative
Senior police appointee chosen by the overall incident commander to be responsible for the release of information on behalf of the police.

### Press liaison officer (scene)
Representatives of each organisation responsible for the initial release of information from the scene of the incident reflecting co-ordinating group policy.

### Press liaison point (PLP)
Premises at or adjacent to the scene designated for exclusive use by accredited media representatives and through which official press releases will be issued.

### Rail incident commander (RIC)
For incidents on infrastructure controlled by Network Rail an incident commander will be appointed. This individual will operate at Gold level and will be remote from the scene.

### Rail incident officer (RIO)
On Network Rail controlled infrastructure the rail industry response to an incident will be led, on site, by the RIO. The RIO will act as a point of contact for the emergency services. Representatives of the train operating companies (TOCs) and contractors will report to the RIO.

### Rendezvous point (RVP)
A point selected by the emergency services as the location for all personnel and vehicles to report to before attending the major incident. It is situated within the outer cordon.

### Rendezvous point officer
Police officer responsible for supervision of the RVP.

### Rescue zone
The area within the inner cordon.

### Resilience mortuary
A predesignated location, which can be used as a mortuary if the scale of the incident renders existing facilities inappropriate. Such locations require detailed preplanning and will be used at a centre for the examination and identification of the deceased.

### Rest centre
Premises designated for the temporary accommodation of evacuees.

### Resource Management Centre (RMC)
LFB Suite at Greenwich View Place that acts as the special command facility for Gold Fire during a major incident.

### RNLI
Royal National Lifeboat Institution.

### Scientific advisor
The Fire Brigade’s qualified scientific and technical advisor at incidents involving hazardous and/or radioactive substances.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector commander (Bronze)</td>
<td>The officer in command of an operational area and having functional responsibility within the controlled area for fire/rescue purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior investigating officer (SIO)</td>
<td>Police senior detective officer appointed by Gold to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver Fire/Medic/Police</td>
<td>The service Incident Commander on the scene.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior identification manager (SIM)</td>
<td>This officer will have overall responsibility for the identification process and sit on the identification commission. Their responsibility would include body recovery, casualty bureau, family liaison and the post/ ante-mortem teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor reception centre</td>
<td>Secure area to which uninjured survivors can be taken for shelter, first aid, interview and documentation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBNC</td>
<td>Thames Barrier Navigation Centre at Woolwich.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TETRA</td>
<td>Terrestrial Trunked Radio Access.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triage sieve</td>
<td>The primary triage system that quickly sorts out casualties into priority groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triage sort</td>
<td>The secondary triage system that is carried out on the arrival of further resources usually taking place in the casualty clearing station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAS</td>
<td>Voluntary Aid Societies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTS</td>
<td>Vessel Traffic Service at TBNC at Woolwich (PLA).</td>
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Appendix H: Glossary of marine terms

Above (a point) Refers to the river upstream of a reference point, not vertically above it.

Below (a point) Refers to the river downstream of a reference point, not physically underneath it.

Downstream (of) That portion of the river which is closer to the estuary than the reference point, for example, ‘downstream of Tower Bridge’.

Air draft The height of a vessel from the water line to the top of its highest structure (mast or superstructure as appropriate).

Bridge clearance The distance from any nominated point on the underside of a bridge to the water level, at any given state of the tide.

Ebb tide A tide which flows from the river’s source towards its estuary (downstream).

Fairway The navigational channel.

Flood tide A tide which flows from the river’s estuary towards its source (upstream).

Foreshore That portion of the river closest to the embankment which is covered by water except at low tide.

Non-tidal Thames Above Teddington Lock the river is non-tidal and the water level remains constant except as it is affected by water entering the river from its tributaries.

Reach A continuous stretch of a river that can be looked along between two bends.

Slack water When the tidal stream is not moving.

Tidal Thames That length of the river where the water level rises and falls due to tidal action. It extends from the estuary to Teddington Lock.

Upstream (of) That portion of the river which is closer to the river’s source than the reference point, for example, ‘upstream of Tower Bridge’.

The above expressions remove the need to use compass points to locate a point that is difficult when the meandering nature of the river is taken into account.

Tidal flow is at its fastest and strongest mid-tide; that is, half-way between high and low water. Tidal flow increases and decreases proportionally about the period of maximum flow.